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I. Introduction
The economic and social crisis in Africa remains a source of
concern for the world community. It is widely acknowledged that
African countries have not been successful in creating viable
economies to provide a decent standard of living for the people of
the continent.1 As a continent, Africa continues to lag behind
t Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern
University, Houston, Texas. Formerly Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of
Sydney, Australia. The research assistance of Akil Butler is gratefully acknowledged.
I O.A.U. Thirty-Second Ordinary Session, Yaounde Declaration (Africa:
Preparing for the 21st Century), OAU Doc. AHGIDecl.3 (XXXII) (July 3-10, 1996),
available at http://www.africanreview.org/docs/govern/yaounde.pdf (taking stock of the
continent, the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) noted that "at the close of
the 20th century .... of all the regions of the world, Africa is indeed the most backward
in terms of development from whatever angle it is viewed and the most vulnerable as far
as peace, security and stability are concerned[.]").
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others in both economic and social indices of human progress.
Although a handful of African countries have achieved decent
rates of economic growth,2 the continent as a whole has
retrogressed in recent decades.3 Despite a substantial endowment
of natural and human resources and significant amounts of foreign
aid,4 African countries perennially under perform the rest of the
world in economic affairs.5 Africa's people have been plagued by
disease and poverty. These problems have been exacerbated by
civil and political conflicts in large swaths of the continent.6
These conflicts impede long-term financial planning and
complicate efforts to attract foreign investments and capital into
the continent.7
2 See John Ruggie, Breaking the Loving Embrace: African Solutions for African
Problems, in HARNESSING THE POWER OF PARTNERSHIP 4 (World Economic Forum,
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
3 Kempe Hope, Toward Good Governance and Sustainable Development: The
African Peer Review Mechanism, 18 GOVERNANCE: INT'L J. POL'Y, ADMIN. & INST. 283,
284 (2005). For example, per capita income in Africa has been on a downward trend.
Id. Per capita income in the continent at the beginning of this century was ten percent
below the level of income in 1980. Id.
4 ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2002:
TRACKING PERFORMANCE AND PROGRESS 28 (2002), available at
http://www.uneca.org/era2002. Africa has been a major recipient of "gross official
development assistance-whether in terms of grants or concessional loans-from
multilateral and bilateral sources." Id. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) through its Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has
provided the largest portion of aid to African countries. Id. In the aforementioned
report, the commission stipulated systematic benchmarking of economic performance of
African countries as one of the means of promoting effective economic policies in the
continent. Id.
5 See id.
6 See WORLD BANK, CAN AFRICA CLAIM THE 21ST CENTURY 59 (2000). Some of
these conflicts have assumed genocidal proportions. Id. For example, the genocide in
Rwanda devastated the country and laid waste to the economy of the region. Id. The
economic costs of these conflicts have been considerable. Id. It is estimated that about
$1 billion a year in Central Africa and $800 million in West Africa are diverted from
development uses to finance conflicts. Id.
7 See ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2005:
CHALLENGES OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY IN AFRICA 34-39 (2005), available at
http://www.uneca.org/era2005. The picture here is painted in broad strokes to highlight
the common problems facing the continent. See id. It should, however, be recognized
that while some patterns and features recur, there is also diversity in the range of
experience and rate of progress. For example, some African countries have lately
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On the bright side, Africa has enjoyed a renaissance of sorts
recently, with a new breed of leaders8 demonstrating renewed
commitment to using fresh and innovative ideas in addressing the
problems of the continent.9 Some of these leaders have been
successful in introducing economic reforms,' improving the
domestic political climate," and building the foundation for
sustainable growth in their countries.' 2  The emergence of more
democratic regimes in Africa in the 1990s has increased the
opportunity for civic action and has provided an avenue for
Africans to hold their governments accountable for the
implementation of more effective government policies.
There has been no shortage of theories that seek to explain the
economic underdevelopment of Africa. Some commentators have
placed a significant portion of the blame on the colonization of the
continent. 13 Others have placed the blame on ineffective economic
recorded more economic success than others. See id. The ECA has attributed these
successes, in part, to good macroeconomic management and improved political climate.
See id. As will become obvious in the discussion below, one of the benefits of country
peer reviews is that they help highlight cases of success so that other countries can learn
from the experience.
8 Robert Rotberg, Strengthening African Leadership, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July-Aug.
2004, at 14 (discussing the emergence of effective African leadership in recent decades).
9 It has been said that introduction of the African Union (AU) is a culmination of a
new consciousness that Africa has to shake off its history of lack of accountability,
subjugation, and oppression so as to realize its full potentials. See infra note 29; Vincent
Nmehielle, The African Union and African Renaissance: A New Era for Human Rights
Protection in Africa? 7 SING. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 412, 416 (2003).
10 See Omar Kabbaj, Foreword to A PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT:
ISSUES AND PARAMETERS 5 (Henock Kifle, Adebayo Olukoshi & Lennart Wohlgemuth,
eds., 1997) (stating that Omar Kabbaj, the former president of the African Development
Bank, has noted that because of economic reforms introduced in parts of the continent,
"African now seems to be on the verge of achieving sustained rates of economic growth
that exceed population growth rates.").
II See id. at II (noting that the "impressive stride[] that has been made towards
political liberalization and democracy by over thirty countries in the region in the last
decade is indeed a cause for optimism about the future").
12 See Kwesi Botchwey, Overcoming Collective Contagion through Sound
Economic Governance, in HARNESSING THE POWER OF PARTNERSHIP, supra note 2, at 12.
13 See generally, e.g., Graziella Bertocchi & Fabio Canova, Did Colonization
Matter for Growth? An Empirical Exploration into the Historical Causes of Africa's
Underdevelopment, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 1851 (2002) (arguing that colonization had a
negative effect on economic growth in Africa).
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and social policies, cultural factors, 14 ineffective institutions, the
structure of the world economy, 15 and large-scale corruption in the
continent. 16  Each of these theories may explain what is
responsible for the conditions in Africa.'7 When States fail their
citizens, it is rarely attributable to one factor, but more frequently
due to a confluence of factors. Nonetheless, despite the varying
explanations for the struggling economic situation in Africa, there
is broad agreement that tackling the problem of poor governance
in the continent is central to promoting its economic and social
development. I8
International concern about the seemingly intractable problems
facing the continent has led to the development of strategies for
stimulating sustainable economic and social development of
Africa.' 9 Some of these efforts originated outside of the continent.
14 See Africa: The Heart of the Matter, THE ECONOMIST, May 13, 2000, at 17.
(stating that although "brutality, despotism and corruption exist everywhere," for
"reasons buried in their culture" African societies are especially susceptible to them.");
see also WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN A
CHANGING WORLD 162 (1997) (suggesting that the "continuing struggle between
traditional forms of governance and social organization (often based on tribes, lineages,
and language and kinship groups) and modern forms of government" was a major cause
of state failure in Africa).
15 See Fantu Cheru, Structural Adjustment, Primary Resource Trade and
Sustainable Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, 20 WORLD DEV. 497, 498 (1992).
16 See The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) [Oct. 2001] 18,
available at www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/inbrief.pdf [hereinafter New
Partnership]. According to NEPAD, the factors accentuating economic
underdevelopment in the continent include the legacies of colonialism, the inadequacies
of social and economic policies pursued by African countries, and the operation of the
international economic system. See id.
17 See id. 22. (noting that "[p]ostcolonial Africa inherited weak states and
dysfunctional economies, which were further aggravated by poor leadership, corruption
and bad governance in many countries").
18 See ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, GOVERNANCE FOR A PROGRESSING
AFRICA: FOURTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FORUM 3 (2005). The Executive Secretary of
the Economic Commission of Africa has acknowledged that "no matter what sectoral
problem or national challenge we face, over and over again, governance turns out to be
pivotal." Id.; see ANDREW CLAYTON, GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRACY & CONDITIONALITY:
WHAT ROLE FOR NGOs 36 (1994) (noting that a "crisis of governance" accounted in
large part for the continent's poor economic performance).
19 See, e.g., Yilmaz Akyuz & Charles Gore, African Economic Development in a
Comparative Perspective 25 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 265 (2001) (arguing for an approach
that draws on both the post-colonial and adjustment periods of the history of the
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The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
other international organizations have been active in conducting
studies, recommending policies, and providing financial assistance
to strengthen African economies and to promote good governance
on the continent. 20  Through the provision of aid, technical
assistance, and economic cooperation, non-African countries have
also assisted in the search for effective responses to the lack of
stimulating development in Africa.2 1
This paper focuses on the African Peer Review Mechanism
(APRM), a peer monitoring project designed to promote good
governance and development in Africa. The introduction of the
APRM reflects a recognition by African governments that self-
monitoring and review will encourage African countries to
improve their standards of governance and provide a mechanism
for both the people of the continent and outsiders to benchmark
the performance of African countries.23  Peer review and
mentoring will also enable stakeholders to hold African
governments accountable for implementing sound policies to
redress problems uncovered during the review process.24
continent).
20 See Howard Stein, Globalisation, Adjustment and the Structural Transformation
of African Economies?: The Role of International Financial Institutions (Ctr. for the
Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Working Paper No. 32/99, May 1999),
abstract available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 165812.
Concerns have been expressed about the effectiveness of some of the economic
development strategies advocated by international institutions. Particularly contentious
were the structural adjustment policies advocated by the IMF in the 1980s. See ROBERT
BIEL, THE NEW IMPERIALISM: CRISIS AND CONDITIONS IN NORTH/SOUTH RELATIONS 231
(2000) (arguing that the structural adjust policies of the IMF were not designed to assist
developing countries but to integrate them into the capitalist system).
21 Although there has been understandable criticism of the level of international
concern about the AIDS epidemic and civil wars on the continent, international
initiatives have actually been somewhat successful in keeping a focus on Africa's
problems. See A. Ali, C. Malwanda & Y. Suliman, Official Development Assistance to
Africa, 8 J. AFR. EcON. 504 (1999).
22 NEPAD, African Peer Review Mechanism, T 2, AHG/235(XXXVIII) Annex 2,
http://nepad.org/2005/files/documents/49.pdf [hereinafter Peer Review].
23 Hope, supra note 3, at 291.
24 See Chris Stals, Member APRM Panel of. Eminent Persons, Address at the
opening ceremony of the National Stakeholders Forum for the African Peer Review
Mechanism (May 27, 2004), available at http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000827/
index.php (stating that as part of the review process, the reviewed country is required to
2006]
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It is widely recognized that "sound economic and corporate
governance, political governance, peace and security are necessary
preconditions for Africa's development."25 By peer monitoring,
African states intend to foster the adoption of practices, standards,
and policies that will promote good governance, sustainable
development, economic growth, and political stability in the
continent.26  The expectation is that peer monitoring will
contribute to the evolution of capable States, which provide
security, create a political and legal climate which fosters
economic growth, promote equitable distribution of wealth, and
tackle the problem of corruption.27
This paper examines how the APRM can promote good
governance in African countries. Part II examines the history of
the APRM and its goals and objectives. Part III examines the
types and stages of reviews. Part IV evaluates the benchmarks
used for measuring the performance of the reviewed countries.
Finally, Part V analyzes the obstacles to the realization of the
goals of the review mechanism and suggests strategies for
ensuring that the review mechanism will achieve its laudable
objective of promoting good governance and sound government
policies in Africa.
II. Context, Goals, and Objectives of the APRM
Important to an understanding of the philosophy behind the
APRM is an appreciation of the continent's history of adversity.
The APRM was developed as a result of the failures of prior
strategies for solving the continent's problems, the renewed
commitment of African leaders to finding local solutions to these
formulate "a Programme of Action with time-bound objectives to guide all stakeholders
in the actions required by all-government, private sector, civil society-to achieve the
common development vision").
25 ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, supra note 18, at 1-2. For a further
discussion of good governance policies and their effect upon African development, see
James Gathii, Retelling Good Governance Narratives about Africa's Economic and
Political Predicaments: Continuities and Discontinuities in Legal Outcomes between
Markets and States, 45 VILL. L. REV. 971 (2000).
26 See Peer Review, supra note 22, 3.
27 ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, supra note 18, at 1-2 (noting that "the
capable state is the foundational prerequisite for a rejuvenated development effort on the
continent.").
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problems, the increasing awareness of the importance of good
governance in economic and social progress, and the desire to
construct a framework for monitoring the commitment of African
countries to principles, policies and practices conducive to
promoting the socio-economic development of the continent. 28 It
is only against the background of the continent's history of
battling socio-economic malaise that the role, prospects, and
challenges of the APRM can be best understood.
African governments have long recognized the need for
collaboration in formulating and implementing economic and
social development policies.29 In conjunction with the United
Nations, African countries have adopted a variety of initiatives
with these purposes. These initiatives include the Lagos Plan of
Action for the Economic Development of Africa,3° the African
Priority Program for Economic Recovery (which transformed into
the United Nations Program of Action for Africa's Economic
Recovery and Development), the African Alternative Framework
to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic
Recovery and Transformation,3 the African Charter for Popular
Participation for Development,32 and the United Nations New
28 See Kempe, supra note 3, at 284-89.
29 See generally Craig Jackson, Constitutional Structure and Governance
Strategies for Economic Integration in Africa and Europe, 13 TRANSNAT'L. L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (2003) (evaluating economic integration initiatives in Africa).
30 See ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA 1980-2000, available at http://www.uneca.org/itca/
ariportal/docs/lagos-plan.PDF. The plan had objectives of promoting high and sustained
economic growth, transforming Africa's economic and social structures, and maintaining
a sustainable resource base for the continent. See id. It also advocated regional
integration as a means of restructuring the fragmented continent into more viable
economic entities. See id.
31 See ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK TO
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES FOR SoCIo-ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND
TRANSFORMATION, available at http://www.uneca.org/publications/ESPD/old/aaf-
sap.pdf (responding to the IMF's structural adjustment policies imposed on several
African countries, by advocating an alternative path that stressed self-reliance, human
development, and economic transformation).
32 See International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and
Development Process in Africa, Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, Feb. 12-16, 1990,
African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation,
available at http://www.uneca.org/publications/DMD/enhancing-african-csos/annex
1.doc. (charter was the product of an The International Conference on Popular
2006]
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Agenda for Development of Africa.33 These initiatives, some of
which were little more than declarations, have received mixed
reviews.34 The principles and policies they articulated were often
laudable, but the most severe problems arose in their
implementation. To improve the quality of governance and the
quality of living in the continent, these principles and policies had
to rise above the fine print of well-articulated declarations to
influence the actual conduct and operations of governments. The
principles and policies rarely rose to this level. Feeble
commitment and inadequate implementation largely explain the
failure to improve economic development in the continent.35
While these plans have not proven successful in resolving the
underlying economic and social problems of the continent, they
nonetheless expressed widespread dissatisfaction with the status
quo and embodied a recognition of the need for change in
approaches to addressing the challenges facing the continent. The
plans also provided an opportunity for African countries and civil
society in the continent to discuss solutions to the problems.
A more recent African economic and social initiative is the
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), an
economic development program of the African Union (AU).36 The
Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa, a collaborative effort
between African governments, African civil society organizations and United Nations
agencies.).
33 See Annex II to G.A. Res. 46/151, 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/151 (Dec. 18,
1991), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r151.htm (agenda,
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1991, represented a compact between African
countries and the international community to transform African economies, reduce their
vulnerabilities to external shocks, integrate them into the global economy, and enhance
their self reliance.).
34 See New Partnership, supra note 16, 42.
35 HOWARD WHITE & TONY KILLICK, AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM:
CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES 45 (2001).
36 See Assembly of the African Union, Second Ordinary Session, Preamble to the
Declaration on the Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development,
AU Doc. Assembly/AU/Decl.8(II), (July 10-12, 2003), available at http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Decisions/hog/12HoGAssembly2003.pdf. The African
Union was set up by the Constitutive Act of the African Union [AU Act], adopted on
July 11, 2000, in Lome Togo by the OAU. CAB/LEG/23.15,8 AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 479
(2000). The AU is charged with the mission of addressing the problems facing the
continent "in the light of the social, economic and political changes taking place in the
world." Id. For an evaluation of the institutional framework of the AU, see Nsongurua
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partnership, which was launched by African leaders in Abuja,
Nigeria, in October 2001, is aimed at providing a fresh framework
for African interaction with the world that is premised on African
countries setting their own agenda for development.37  The
partnership evolved from two overlapping economic initiatives for
the revitalization of Africa. The first was the Millennium
Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) devised
by Presidents Mbeki of South Africa, Obasanjo of Nigeria, and
Bouteflika of Algeria on a mandate by the Organization for
African Unity (OAU).38 MAP embodied a commitment by
African leaders to a shared vision "to eradicate poverty and to
place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path
of sustainable growth and development, and to participate actively
in the world economy and body politic."'3 9
The second was the Omega Plan for Africa put forward by
President Wade of Senegal. 4° The Omega Plan was an attempt to
Udombana, Can the Leopard Change Its Spots? The African Union Treaty and Human
Rights, 17 AM. U. INT'L REV. 1177 (2002). The AU replaced the Organization of African
Unity (OAU). See The Durban Declaration in Tribute to the Organization for African
Unity and on the Launching of the African Union, Durban, South Africa, July 10-12,
2002. AU Doc. ASS/AU/Decl. 2(1).
37 New Partnership, supra note 16, T 48. Some of the previous economic
development initiatives in Africa have been condemned as impositions from abroad
which were designed without proper regard to the peculiar problems of the continent.
See, e.g., Anthony Baah, History of African Development Initiatives, paper presented at
workshop of the African Labor Research Network, Johannesburg, May 2003, available
at www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000407/index.php (arguing that African countries
have been fertile grounds for experimentation of foreign economic initiatives, in
particular the World Bank/ IMF structural adjustment programs of the 1980s).
38 In its 1999 summit, the OAU gave the presidents a mandate to engage the
industrialized world with an aim of developing a constructive partnership for the
regeneration of the continent. See OAU, Algiers Declaration, July 12-14, 1999,
AHG/Decl. 1 (XXXV), available at http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/summitcouncil
/algiers.htm.
39 NEPAD, THE MILLENNIUM PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICAN RECOVERY PROGRAMME I
1 (Mar. 2001), available at http://www.nepad.org.ng/PDF/About%20Nepad/map3
A.pdf. The key priorities of MAP were to promote peace, security and governance, to
invest in Africa's people, to diversity Africa's production and exports, and to invest in
infrastructural development in the continent. Id. MAP recognized the importance of
mobilizing existing human and material resources, and using them in bold and
imaginative ways to eradicate poverty and to uplift the people of the continent. Id.
40 See Dani Nabudere, NEPAD: Historical Background and Prospects, 8, paper
presented at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, Aug. 2002,
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
draw from the lessons of failed economic experiments in the
continent and to formulate renewed "economic policies that would
eradicate poverty and improve the well-being of the people" of
Africa. 41  Focusing mainly on infrastructural development, the
plan called for a framework of regional policies for addressing the
economic problems of the continent.42 It also contained strategies
for conducting needs assessments, organizing financing, and
engineering action in the priority areas of basic infrastructure,
education, health, and agriculture.43
Due to concerns about a possible conflict of the goals of both
projects, the 2001 OAU summit approved the merger of MAP and
the Omega Plan to form the New African Initiative (NAI),4 an
initiative which later transformed into NEPAD. 4' NEPAD was
conceived as "Africa's principal agenda for economic
development, providing a holistic, comprehensive integrated
strategic framework for the socio-economic development of the
continent, within the institutional framework of the African
Union."
46
The creation of NEPAD was greeted with enthusiasm and
support both inside and outside the continent.47  However,
available at http://www.worldsummit2002.org/texts/DaniWNabudere.pdf.
41 NEPAD, THE OMEGA PLAN FOR AFRICA $ 19, May 2001, available at
http:/lwww.sarpn.org.zaINEPAD/Omega.pdf [hereinafter OMEGA REPORT].
42 Id. at 23. Regional organizations in Africa, such as the East African
Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have attempted to strengthen
sub-regional economic integration and promote good governance in Africa. For a
discussion of regional integration in Africa, see African Development Bank, REGIONAL
INTEGRATION IN AFRICA (2002).
43 OMEGA REPORT, supra note 41, 27.
44 See NEPAD, A NEW AFRICAN INITIATIVE: MERGER OF THE MILLENNIUM
PARTNERSHIP FOR THE AFRICAN RECOVERY PROGRAMME (MAP) AND OMEGA PLAN
(2001), available at http://www.nepad.org.ng/PDF/About%20Nepad/NAI.pdf.
45 Nabudere, supra note 40, at 8.
46 Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa, Background on the New
Partnership for Africa's Development, May 2002, http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/
background/nepad.htm.
47 See, e.g., statement of Prime Minister of Canada Jean Chretien to the
Commonwealth Business Forum, Abuja, Nigeria, Dec. 4, 2003, available at
http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=archivechretien&Sub=Speec
hes&Doc=commonwealthbusinessforum.20031204-e.htm (lauding the creation of
[Vol. XXXII
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concerns were also expressed about the degree of external
influence in its creation,48 the lack of a "social anchor" to its
economic governance regime,49 and the good faith of its foreign
partners.5" To viewers, NEPAD represents a fresh effort to
address the myriad problems facing the continent.5 NEPAD is
attractive, in part, because its primary documents reject the
traditional model of excessive reliance on foreign assistance and
NEPAD and pledging the cooperation of the Canadian government to the initiative).
48 See United Nations Declaration on the New Partnership for Africa's
Development, G.A. Res. 57/2, 1 6, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/57/2 (Sept.
16, 2002). In supporting the implementation of NEPAD, the UN urged the international
community and donor countries to assist in the implementation of the NEPAD agenda.
See id. Some commentators, however, expressed concern about the role of the foreign
partners in NEPAD. Professor S.K.B. Asante called it a "partnership of unequal
partners." S.K.B. Asante, A Partnership of Unequal Partners, NEW AFRICAN, June
2003, at 14; see also Victor Mosoti, The New Partnership for Africa's Development:
Institutional and Legal Challenges of Investment Promotion, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 145,
150 (2004) (suggesting that NEPAD is tainted by excessive external dependence like
most African development models).
49 See Adebayo Olukoshi, Governing the African Developmental Process: The
Challenge of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), at 7 (Center of
African Studies, University of Copenhagen, Occasional Paper), available at
http://www.teol.ku.dk/cas/nyhomepage/mapper/Occasional%20Papers/Occ-Olukoshi.do
c ([NEPAD lacks a] "social anchor that can ensure that the democracy and governance
proposals that are made are moved from the realm of the pro forma and
technocratic/managerial to the arena of the political.").
50 See Letter from Jubilee Debt Campaign to Prime Minister Tony Blair, (Dec. 6,
2005), available at http://www.wdm.org.uk/campaigns/debt/nigeria/jointletterto
blair.doc. The good faith of the international community in addressing the continent has
been called into question by recent developments in the Africa debt relief project. In
2005, Nigeria entered into an agreement with Western debtors on the cancellation of
some of its foreign debt. Under the agreement, Nigeria is required to pay $12.4 billion.
Id. There has been widespread criticism of the agreement. For example, the £1.7 billion
that Nigeria will pay the UK government under the agreement is twice what the UK
government gave in aid to the whole of Africa in 2005 and is "more than the UK will
contribute to the G8 debt cancellation deal for 18 other poor countries over the next 30
years." Id.; see Letter from Archbishop Desmond Tutu to the British Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Gordon Brown (Jan. 27, 2006), available at http://www.wdm.org.uk/
campaigns/debt/tutuletter.pdf (accussing the Western debtors of "a meanness of spirit"
which stands in opposition to the sentiments they have expressed in support of economic
development in the continent).
51 Olukoshi, supra note 49, at 16. Although some have indicated a close
relationship between aspects of the NEPAD plan of action and the IMFfWorld Bank neo-
liberal agenda of the 1980s, NEPAD represents a more integrated strategy that builds on
intra-African solutions and partnerships with the international community. Id.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. XXXH
loans as stimulus for economic progress in Africa.5 2  Instead,
NEPAD focuses primarily on building partnerships for progress,
first within Africa, and then between Africa and the rest of the
world.53 These partnerships are to be founded on a new paradigm
of self-reliance, self-discipline, and constructive engagement with
the rest of the world.54 Nevertheless, NEPAD is distinguished by
its emphasis on local solutions to the problems of the continent, its
commitment to market polices,55 its promise to foster good
governance, and its emphasis of African responsibility and
leadership in the march toward the continent's development. 6
Although NEPAD places primacy on local solutions to African
problems, it also recognizes that local initiatives have to be
complemented by assistance from the industrialized world in terms
of market access, foreign direct investments, and debt relief.57 By
offering to hold African leaders accountable for the
implementation of pro-growth policies and the running of
52 According to NEPAD's New Partnership, it is the responsibility of African
leaders to articulate regional priorities and development plans, and spearhead their
implementation. See New Partnership, supra note 16, 11 47, 49.
53 Id. 7, 8.
54 See Communiqu6 by President Obasanjo Issued at the End of the Third Meeting
of the African Peer Review Mechanism Panel of Eminent Persons, Nov. 2003, at 14-15,
http://www.nepad.org. According to President Obasanjo of Nigeria, NEPAD provides a
"common African platform from which to engage the rest of the international community
in a dynamic partnership that holds real prospects for creating a better life for all
[Africans]." Id.
55 For a critique of the role of market policies in NEPAD, see James Gathii, A
Critical Appraisal of the NEPAD Agenda in Light of Africa's Place in the World Trade
Regime in an Era of Market Centered Development, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 179, 187-92 (2003).
56 See New Partnership, supra note 16, T 48 (arguing that the partnership
represents a new method of interaction with the international community "based on the
agenda set by African peoples through their own initiatives and of their own volition, to
shape their own destiny").
57 See Adebayo Adedeji, NEPAD: A View from the African Trenches in, NEPAD:
AFRICAN INITIATIVE, NEW PARTNERSHIP? 20 (2002), available at http://
www.ipacademy.org/PDFReports/NEPAD.pdf. Some commentators have cautioned
against excessive emphasis on foreign assistance. Professor Adebayo Adedeji, the
former Executive Director of the Economic Commission for Africa, has suggested that a
strategy of eliminating the waste of domestic resources, reduction of capital leakages,
debt relief, and reform of the commodity trade would be more successful than reliance
on the injection of foreign capital. See id.
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functional, democratic public institutions, NEPAD's proponents
anticpate that foreign partners will regain confidence in the
investment climate in the continent and provide the necessary
complementary support.58
Some have expressed the understandable concern that by being
partially built on the expectation of support, NEPAD may afford
international economic organizations and industrialized countries a
channel for exerting direct pressure and influence on the operation
of African governments.59 This concern is motivated by
disillusionment with the economic policies prescribed by the
World Bank, the IMF, and western governments. 60 Also, there is a
suspicion that any partnership with international economic
institutions may present a renewed opportunity for external
pressure to be reintroduced into the continent. 6' However, this
concern is mitigated by the fact that NEPAD's plan of action and
its core commitments were drafted, and can be amended, by
African countries.62 Far from comprising a set of policies and
practices imposed from the outside by international institutions
and foreign governments, NEPAD's project embodies a
recommitment by African leaders to a set of principles, policies,
and practices that are conventionally viewed as foundations for the
58 Gathii, supra note 55, at 187. Some view this expectation of foreign cooperation
and support as inimical to the interests of the continent. James Gathii has lamented that
"NEPAD is less a pledge to govern with the best set of policies that might make a real
difference for Africa's economic and political future than it is a plan to open the flow of
donor funds and credit." Id.
59 See Press Release, NEPAD News, Recent Developments in the APRM in Kenya
and the Continental Process (July 30, 2005), available at http://www.nepad.org/
2005/news/wmprint.php?ArtlD=37. Responding to the concern that foreign donors may
condition foreign assistance on participation in the APRM process, the Executive
Director of the APRM, Bernard Kouassi, noted that although "some donors and
development partners could use the results of the APRM assessment or reviews to make
decisions on aid and development assistance, [] this is not the primary purpose of the
APRM or its intention." Id. Kouassi further noted that APRM is a peer learning and
experience-sharing process. Id.
60 See Stein, supra note 20. An example is the structural adjustment program
advocated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s. Id.
61 Len Verwey, Nepad and Civil Society Participation in the APRM, (IDASA,
occasional paper), at 11 -12, available at http://www.un-ngls.org/cso/cso8/nepad.pdf.
62 See generally New Partnership, supra note 16.
2006]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
creation of self-sustaining and vibrant economies.63 Moreover, the
legitimate concerns about the adverse effects of the structural
adjustment policies of the 1980s do not justify an inherent
suspicion of market-based solutions to the problems of the
continent. 4  To be sure, the force-fed "shock therapy" 6 of the
1980s had deleterious effects on the economies of African
countries and created social problems in some of these countries.66
It is now generally accepted that the "shock therapy" of the
structural adjustment program-with its advocacy of the
elimination of price controls, the reduction of government
spending, the removal of government subsidies, and the
dismantling of trade barriers-did not achieve its declared
objective of stimulating the economies of African countries. 67 The
lesson to be learned from the failure of these economic
improvement policies is not that some of these policies are
inherently ineffective, but that economic policies should be
carefully tailored to suit the needs of particular countries, bearing
in mind their history, political structure,68 and public institutions.69
63 Id. 79.
64 See generally New Partnership, supra note 16. It should be reiterated that
NEPAD is more than a collection of market-based solutions to the problems of Africa.
As the core principles make clear, it emphasizes a coordinated strategy of the application
of market-based principles, respect for property rights and the rule of law, enforcement
of democratic principles, and the creation of effective public institutions. Id.
65 See John Marangos, The Political Economy of Shock Therapy 16 J. ECON.
SURVS. 41(2002).
66 Adebayo Adedeji, An Alternative for Africa, in ECONOMIC REFORM AND
DEMOCRACY 126 (Larry Diamond & Marc Plattner eds., 1995) ("Far from bringing about
economic reform, these SAPs [structural adjustment policies] have severely eroded the
developmental drive that has always been the best hope for stabilizing the precarious
political structures that succeeded colonialism.").
67 But see World Bank, ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA REFORMS, RESULTS, AND THE ROAD
AHEAD 219 (1994) (arguing that the policies were useful in laying a foundation for
economic recovery).
68 See David Dollar & Jacob Svensson, What Explains the Success or Failure of
Structural Adjustment Programs? (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No.
1938, 1998), available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/
Workpapers/WPS1900series/wps1938/wps1938.pdf (arguing that the World Bank has
accepted the importance of democratic institutions in the success of economic reforms).
69 See, e.g., James Surowiecki, Morales's Mistake, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 23-30,
2006, at 38 (arguing that the mistake of neo-liberalism was to assume that "good
government policies alone were what mattered"). Neo-liberal economics is partly
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Moreover, there has to be a local impetus for genuine reform.7 ° It
must be remembered that NEPAD is an African initiative and that
its policies and practices, articulated by African countries, will be
informed by an appreciation of the peculiar social and cultural
environment of the continent.
NEPAD focuses on five broad policy areas: democracy,
governance, and peace and security; economic and corporate
governance; infrastructure and information technology; human
resource development; and agriculture and market access.7 Of
particular relevance to this paper is the commitment to good
governance. Pursuant to this commitment, members are obligated
to implement processes, policies and practices that accord with
democratic values, the rule of law, transparency, accountability,
integrity, respect for human rights, and promote socio-economic
development.
Encouraging good governance is one of the most
commendable features of NEPAD. By emphasizing governance,
African leaders acknowledge that they need to take primary
responsibility for promoting principles and policies conducive to
the creation of viable and effective government institutions
responsive to the needs of their people.
Good governance has been described as a condition in which
the responsibilities of government are "discharged in an effective,
transparent, and accountable manner. 72  This implies the
maintenance of efficient and accountable institutions,
entrenchment of pro-development principles, protection of human
concerned with the minimization of state intervention in the market and the integration
of national economies into the international market economy. The structural adjustment
policies were designed to achieve these twin objectives. Id.
70 See Yvonne Tsikata, Owning Economic Reforms (World Inst. for Dev. Econ.
Research, United Nations University, Discussion Paper No. 2001/53, 2001), available at
http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/dps/dp2001-53.pdf (discussing the role of local
ownership to the success of economic reforms).
71 See Guimisai Mutume, New Barriers Hinder African Trade, 19 AFRICA
RENEWAL 19 (Jan. 2006) available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/
vol19no4/194trade.html (noting that African countries continue to face regulatory
barriers to their agricultural exports).
72 See Kempe Ronald Hope Sr., Director, Dev. Mgmt. Div., UN Econ. Comm'n for
Africa, Paper Presented at the Harvard Int'l Dev. Conference: The UNECA and Good
Governance in Africa, (Apr. 4-5, 2003), at 2, available at http://www.uneca.org/
eca-programmes/development-policy-management/HopeHarvard.doc.
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rights, respect of the rule of law, and the provision of a mechanism
for popular participation in governance and decision-making.73
Good governance requires the creation of functional governments,
an atmosphere that fosters civic participation, and an environment
that promotes public accountability of government officials.74 It
also entails the exercise of public authority for the common
good.75
There is an increasing awareness that good governance is
central to the building of socially and economically successful
nations.76 Studies have shown a positive correlation between good
governance and economic progress, demonstrated by increased
levels of income, social welfare, and investment.77 There is also a
strong correlation between good governance and economic
competitiveness,7 8 the latter being a collection of policies and
factors that influence the level of productivity and that thereby
determine the level of economic prosperity.79 Studies have also
demonstrated that the rule of law and the protection of property
rights 80 are central to the development of strong market economies
that generate the wealth necessary for lifting people out of
poverty.8'
73 Id. at 2-3.
74 Id.
75 See Daniel Kaufmann, Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption, in
THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2005-2006 81-95 (2005). Kaufmann notes that
governance has a political dimension ("the process by which [officials] are selected,
monitored, and replaced"), an economic dimension (government capacity for effective
economic management and implementation of sound policies), and an institutional
dimension (respect for a country's institutions). Id. at 82.
76 See Kofi Annan, Sec'y-Gen., UN, Address to the African Union Summit 2 (July
6, 2004), transcript available at http://www.africa-union.org/au%20summit%202004/
speech%20Mr%2OKofi%2OAnnan%2006-07-04.pdf) (noting "the root causes of
insecurity and underdevelopment" often lie in poor governance).
77 Id. at 3. Daniel Kaufmann has argued that there is "a growing consensus among
both academics and policymakers that good governance provides the fundamental basis
for economic development." Kaufmann, supra note 75, at 83. He is of the view that
governments receive a "development dividend" from better governance. Id.
78 Kaufmann, supra note 75, at 84.
79 Augusto Lopez-Claros, Executive Summary to Kaufmann, supra note 75, at xiii.
80 See id. at xxiv. The report agrees that a strong case can be made for "secure
property rights as the key to promoting investment in Africa." Id.
81 See Francis N. Botchway, Good Governance: The Old, the New, the Principle,
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Protection of human rights, another aspect of good
governance, is essential to providing a climate where all members
of society are able to contribute their talents and skills to the
economic and social life of a society.82 In Africa, human rights
problems have created an environment of chronic instability,
thereby preventing substantial segments of the population from
actively participating in the civic and economic life of their
societies.83  Civil strife, political repression, and gender
inequalities-all of which implicate the issue of human
rights-have impeded economic productivity in the continent.84
While human rights protection is not the sole solution to the
problems of the region, it is recognized as the foundation of
stability, which is necessary for economic progress. 85
Commendably, the emphasis of human rights protection as part of
the good governance initiative within NEPAD would put pressure
on African countries to take more effective measures to shore up
human rights protection across the continent.
86
The importance of popular participation in government to the
concept of good governance is buttressed by the fact that popular
participation fosters accountability, an element vital to making
governments responsive to the needs of the governed. The link
between popular participation in government and economic
progress is, however, less certain87 because some hold the view
that authoritarianism as better suited for promoting economic
and the Elements, 13 FLA. J. INT'L L. 159, 195 (2001).
82 See Yi FENG, DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE 295 (2003) (arguing that "a political system characterized by
freedom and stability is best suited to promoting a growth-oiented economic agenda").
83 See Dejo Olowu, Human Development Challenges in Africa: A Rights-Based
Approach, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 179, 208 (2004).
84 Id.
85 See Ubong E. Effeh, Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study on How Not to Realize
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and a Proposal for Change, 3 NW. U. J. INT'L
HUM. RTS. 2, 76 (2005).
86 See generally James Thuo Gathii, Good Governance as a Counter-Insurgency
Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social Projects in International Law, 5
BuFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 107 (1999) (discussing how governance arguments are
sometimes used to put neo-liberal economic views at the forefront of human rights).
87 See Joseph Siegle, Michael Weinstein, & Morton Halperin, Why Democracies
Excel, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 57.
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development.88  China, for example, has made remarkable
economic progress in the past few decades, although its
democratic credentials remain in dispute.89 Regardless of whether
popular participation is a predicate for economic progress, it is
evident that popular participation promotes public accountability
and that accountable governments have a heightened incentive to
govern in accordance with the wishes and interests of their
citizenry. Periodic renewals of political mandates provide an
opportunity for debate and dialogue on solutions to the problems
facing the electorate, thereby enhancing the likelihood of effective
government policies. 90 Absent periodic renewals of mandates, the
governed are unable to provide a check on the tendency of public
officials to use the instruments of government to promote personal
rather than public interests. 91
To be sure, governance is not the only force behind economic
development. Sound economic, trade, social, and other
government policies are as important as good governance. 92
However, when "governance is poor, policymaking in other areas
88 See, e.g., GEORG SORENSEN, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 64 (1993); see
also M.G. Quibria, Growth and Poverty: Lessons from the East Asian Miracle Revisited,
ASIAN DEV. BANK INST. RESEARCH PAPER 33, 62-65 (2002) (discussing the economic
success of authoritarian regimes in East Asia).
89 See GREG MASTEL, THE RISE OF THE CHINESE ECONOMY: THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
EMERGES (1997).
90 When authoritarian governments succeed in promoting economic development,
it is often because of the implementation of effective economic policies against the
background of a pro-business culture. As Quibria has noted, "whether politically
autocratic or not, [successful] economies provided framework critical to economic
freedoms and structure of market-supporting institutions needed for the economy to
blossom." Sorensen, supra note 88, at iv. In the African context, authoritarian and
unaccountable regimes have not been successful in creating the right climate for
economic progress. Accountable governments have a greater incentive to do so. Id.
91 See David S. Samford, Note, Cutting Deals in Smoke-filled Free Rooms: A Case
Study in Public Choice Theory, 87 KY. L.J. 845, 848 (1999). Public choice theory has
been instrumental in popularizing the view that whether acting in the public or private
capacity, individuals are usually motivated by self-interest. Id. at 848. This theory has
helped promote a healthy skepticism of the motivations of public officials. Id. at 847.
92 See generally Peter Nyikuli, Unlocking Africa's Potential: Some Factors
Affecting Economic Development and Investment in Africa, 30 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS.
623 (1999) (stating the importance of trade, environmental, aid, and other policies in the
economic development of Africa).
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is also, and often, compromised. 9 3
Poor governance has long been prevalent in Africa.94 Many
African countries are not just poor, but also poorly governed.95
According to the Economic Commission for Africa, the "vast
majority of African countries recognize that political and
economic mismanagement, denial of democracy and human rights,
and the existence of weak institutions all deepen the continent's
poverty... and make achievement of any sustainable
development goal more elusive., 96  Poor governance negatively
affects African countries in various ways. For example, it partly
explains why African countries have not been very successful in
attracting foreign investments. 97 Investor confidence in a country
often depends on governance issues, including the impartial
enforcement of laws, regulatory burdens on businesses, quality of
bureaucracy, effective systems for the enforcement of commercial
obligations, corruption, and institutional constraints on
governmental action.98  African countries have not hitherto
demonstrated a strong commitment to addressing these
governance issues, a factor that has significantly contributed to the
deplorable state of the continent. 99
Consequently, improvement in governance is widely viewed as
a precondition to economic and social progress in the continent.100
Because of the centrality of good governance to the problems
93 Kaufmann, supra note 75, at 86.
94 See WORLD BANK, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE
GROWTH 60 (1989) (The bank noted that "underlying the litany of Africa's development
problems is a crisis of governance.").
95 Kaufmann, supra note 75, at 86 ("38 out of the 46 countries in the region are
both poorer than the world average, and also exhibit worse governance than the world
average.").
96 ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, supra note 18, at 7.
97 See Peter Mutharika, Some Thoughts on Rebuilding African State Capacity, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 281, 283 (1998).
98 See Nina B. Bubnova, Governance Impact on Private Investment: Evidence from
the International Patterns of Infrastructure Bond Risk Pricing xii (World Bank Technical
Paper No. 488, Aug. 2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/ (go to
"Publications", "Documents and Reports" and type "WTP488") (arguing that
governance risk has a strong impact on investor confidence).
99 Mutharika, supra note 97, at 284.
100 ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, supra note 18, at 9.
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plaguing Africa, foreign investment, debt relief, and foreign aid
are now frequently conditioned on the recipient country improving
its standards of governance.'0 ' The advocates of the African
renaissance"' realized that if their goal of repositioning the
continent for economic growth and social progress was to be
successful, it was necessary to devise a system for restoring the
confidence of the international community in Africa's
commitment to the implementation of pro-growth policies and
practices.'13  It was also vital to establish democratic and
accountable institutions to implement these policies."
NEPAD is a means for African countries to stipulate standards
and practices conducive to sound economic, political, and
corporate governance.' 5 It requires members to commit to the
implementation of identified core standards and practices aimed at
promoting these goals. The drafters of NEPAD realized that it
was not sufficient merely to require commitment to these
standards and practices. The history of African cooperation is
littered with the remnants of various well-intended economic
blueprints that were either not implemented or were improperly
executed. The experience of African economic underdevelopment
has not been one of a lack of good ideas or effective models for
building the foundations of economic progress; instead, it has been
one of poor execution and a lack of fidelity to promises.0 6 The
drafters of NEPAD, therefore, felt that it was necessary not only to
101 Id. at 7.
102 Mosoti, supra note 48, at 146. The African renaissance, a concept popularized
by the South African President Thabo Mbeki, is a vision for the rebirth, renewal and
revival of the continent. Id. Its advocates stress the importance of political, economic
and social reforms as a means of revitalizing the continent. Id.; see also Nmehielle,
supra note 9.
103 Hope, supra note 3, at 303-04.
104 New Partnership, supra note 16, 49, 79.
105 Ousmane Deme, Between Hope and Scepticism: Civil Society and the African
Peer Review Mechanism 23 (Partnership Africa Canada, Occasional Paper, Oct. 2005),
at 1, available at http://www.pacweb.org/e/images/stories/documents (click on "between
hope and sce..>" dated '19-Oct-2005 10:11").
106 See Sonny Nwankwo & Darlington Richards, Privatization: The Myth of Free
Market Orthodoxy in Sub-Saharan Africa 14 INT'L J. PUB. SECTOR MGMT. 165, 172
(2001). In reviewing recent privatization initiatives in Africa, Nwankwo and Richards
note that implementation failures of privatization on the continent are largely due to
corruption and mismanagement. Id.
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enshrine core standards and practices, but also to provide a process
for ensuring that members comply with them. °7 The APRM
became the solution.1
0 8
Because of NEPAD's emphasis on the need for Africans to be
at the center stage of finding solutions to the problems of the
continent, an indigenous peer review mechanism was viewed as
critical.° 9 In recognition of the importance of the efficient use of
foreign assistance, donor countries and organizations have been
conditioning their financial and technical assistance on the
implementation of reforms in recipient countries and have been
subjecting recipient countries to assessment reviews."0 African
countries have expressed concern about the fairness and
predictability of these assessments and have argued the need for an
African framework of peer assessment and monitoring. According
to Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda, "African countries have
107 Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda, Corporate Governance and the African Peer
Review Mechanism, Address at the COMESA Summit 1 (June 7, 2004), transcript
available at http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/dO00838/P950-KagameJune2004.pdf
#search=%22kagame%2C%20corporate%20governance%22. NEPAD countries
decided to "develop a culture of peer-assessment in order to determine to what extent
[they] are complying with agreed codes, standards, and commitments that underpin good
governance and sustainable development." Id.
108 AFRICAN MINISTERS OF FINANCE, PLANNING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
THIRTY-SIXTH SESSION OF THE COMMISSION/CONFERENCE OF AFRICAN MINISTERS OF
FINANCE, PLANNING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (June 1, 2003), http://www.uneca.org
(search site for "ministerial statement, 1 June 2003" to go directly to document)
According to African Ministers of Finance, the review mechanism is expected to
"provide a systematic assessment that will allow [members] to track the progress of
projected outcomes, identifying and reinforce best practices, assess capacity gaps, and
implement the required corrective actions." Id. So far, twenty-three African countries
have acceded to the APRM: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt,
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mail, Malawi, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and
Uganda. Press Release, NEPAD, Press Release on the 4th Summit of the APR Forum to
be held 22 Jan. 2006, Khartoum, Sudan (Jan. 21 2006),
http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/aprm/PressRelease21012006.pdf.
109 See NEPAD, OBJECTIVES, STANDARDS, CRITERIA AND INDICATORS FOR THE
AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM 1.2, available at http://www.nepad.org/
2005/files/documents/I 10.pdf [hereinafter Indicators].
110 See Maurizio Carbone, Assessing the European Community Development P6licy:
The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review, THE COURIER ACP-
EU, Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 34, available at http://europa.eu.int/conm/development/body/
publications/courier/courierl94/en/en_034.pdf.
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been subjected to assessment methods and standards determined
by bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, which, needless to
say, kept shifting goal posts, or used different yardsticks,
depending on their whims.""' He further noted that these
assessments "often lacked credibility, consistency, and mutual
accountability." ' 12 By emphasizing the issue of peer monitoring,
African countries wanted to reassert their control of the process for
assessing their progress toward institutional and democratic
reforms." 3  Peer monitoring by African countries represents, in
part, an effort to reverse a history of "donor-driven
conditionalities" by promoting mutual accountability within the
continent. 1
4
What do NEPAD and the African Union hope to achieve
through the APRM? Before discussing the expectations of
NEPAD and the African Union from the review process, it is
important to describe the concept of peer review and explain its
role in promoting governmental reforms. Peer review is the
systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a
state by its peers or by designated institutions." 5 It is usually a
non-adversarial process aimed at obtaining information from the
country that is being reviewed and using the information to assess
its compliance with stipulated policies, practices, and principles.
The most common uses of the peer review process are "the
assessment of the performance of a country in its implementation
of policy recommendations and guidelines" and "an examination
of the consistency and coherence with respect to the country's own
111 Kagame, supra note 107, at I.
112 Id.
113 See Nkosanzana Zuma, S. Aft. Minister of Foreign Affairs, NEPAD's Peer
Review Mechanism, Speech at the 2nd Annual Meeting of the AFRM Panel of Eminent
Persons 2 (Oct. 3, 2003), transcript available at http://www.sarpn.org.za/
documents/d00O0564/P518_Zuma_03102003.pdf (noting that "the APRM would be
more about ownership of the process and adapting it to circumstances that are relevant to
Africa through identified areas of priority[.]").
114 See Adedeji, supra note 57, at 9.
115 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, The African Peer Review
Mechanism: Process and Procedures, Paper Presented at the NEPAD Workshop held in
Cape Town, October 2002, in AFR. SEC. REV., VOL. 11, No. 4, 2002, available at
www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/I 1 no4/featurel.html.
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policies."'1 16  For example, in the context of environmental
performance and development assistance, peer reviews are
typically used to evaluate the performance of a country against the
background of indicators and benchmarks that provide specific
numerical targets. "7  In the legal context, peer reviews are
traditionally used to monitor "compliance with international norms
such as the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions.' ' 18
Peer reviews have both quantitative and qualitative aspects,
both of which are necessary for the effectiveness of the process." 9
The qualitative aspect involves a thorough assessment of the
performance of a country using detailed and publicized criteria.
The quantitative aspect involves the use of scoreboards to rank the
performance of country, such as the Global Competitiveness
Report. 120 Publicized ranking of performance operates to ventilate
the shortcomings of a country and to encourage or "shame" the
country into taking remedial measures.121
In addition to a monitoring function, peer reviews also provide
a forum for countries to share experiences and exchange ideas on
how to promote mutually agreed-upon goals and objectives. 122
Peer interaction is particularly useful among countries that have
common interests or that face common challenges. By exchanging
ideas and benchmarking their performance, these countries are
able to identify areas of weaknesses in their policy strategies and
obtain feedback from their peers on how to make improvements.
123
Because peer reviews are usually voluntary and non-adversarial,
participating countries are able to interact in an atmosphere of trust




119 See MALACHIA MATHOHO, THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM: A PANACEA
FOR AFRICA'S GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES? 8 (2003), available at http://www.
cps.org.za/cps%20pdf/polbrief29.pdf.
120 See generally THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2005-2006, supra note 75.
121 See FABRIZIO PAGANI, PEER REVIEW: A TOOL FOR CO-OPERATION AND CHANGE
6, (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/16/1955285.pdf.
122 Id. at 11.
123 Hope, supra note 3, at 290.
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process.24
The peer review process usually results in a report that outlines
the performance and shortcomings of the country reviewed and
also recommends improvements. 25 Circulation of the report to the
members of the organization conducting the review provides an
opportunity for the exercise of peer pressure, a necessary
ingredient for the effectiveness of peer reviews. 26 Peer pressure
arises from "a mix of formal recommendations and informal
consultations by peer countries; public scrutiny, comparisons, and
ranking among countries; and the impact of the foregoing on pubic
opinion, policy makers, and other stakeholders."'' 27  Unlike
sanctions, peer pressure is not coercive.12 8 Rather, it is a means of
"soft persuasion," a necessary encouragement for the reviewed
country to reform and to rededicate itself to accomplishing set
goals and standards. 1
29
Circulation of the report to members of the peer group is
typically followed by wider publication. 3 ° When the report enters
the public domain, citizens and pressure groups are able to exert
influence on the reviewed country to address the shortcomings
identified in the report. Public scrutiny is useful in persuading
countries to take corrective measures.' 3' Reiterating the
importance of publicizing the outcomes of peer reviews, the
Economic Commission for Africa has noted that the experience of
peer reviews in other parts of the world indicates that the
effectiveness of the mechanism is increased when outcomes are
publicized. 13 2 In the Commission's view, the public scrutiny that
comes with publicizing the findings is the feedback most likely to
124 PAGANI, supra note 121, at 13.
125 Peer Review, supra note 22, 22.
126 Hope, supra note 3, at 290.
127 Id.
128 See Zuma, supra note 113, at 2 (stating that the ARRM is "not an instrument for
punishment or exclusion, but rather it is a mechanism to identify strong points or areas,
share them and to rectify weak areas.").
129 MATHOHO, supra note 119, at 7.
130 Peer Review, supra note 22, 25.
131 Hope, supra note 3, at 290.
132 Unitd Nations Economic Commission for Africa, supra note 115.
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encourage the reviewed country to take corrective actions. 133
The APRM is founded on an appreciation of the foregoing
benefits of peer review and peer pressure in getting countries to
comply with mutual goals and objectives. 34 According to its Base
Document, the APRM is "an instrument voluntarily acceded by
Member States of the African Union as an African self-monitoring
mechanism."' 135 The document further defines the mandate of the
APRM as ensuring that "the policies and practices of participating
states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate
governance values, codes, and standards contained in the
Declaration of Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate
Governance."' 36  It further defines the primary purpose of the
APRM as fostering "the adoption of policies, standards, and
practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth,
sustainable development, and accelerated sub-regional and
continental economic integration through sharing of experiences
and reinforcement of successful and best practice."' 37
Apart from encouraging members to adopt and implement
policies and practices consistent with the mutually agreed upon
values and standards of political, economic, and corporate
governance, the APRM is also aimed at promoting greater
transparency in the affairs of its participants. 3 8 The APRM works
toward greater transparency by requiring public disclosure of
government policies, measures, and practices. 3 9 Public disclosure
will create greater transparency, and by so doing, will promote
good governance. This is because an informed citizenry is better
133 Id.
134 Peer Review, supra note 22, 3.
135 Id. 1 1. Membership of the APRM is open to members of the African Union. Id.
5. In order for a participating state to withdraw from the APRM, the state must submit
written notice to the NEPAD Secretariat expressing their desire to terminate their
involvement. AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
ON THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM, T 32, available at http://nepad.org/
2005/files/documents/l 11 .pdf [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING].
136 Peer Review, supra note 22, 2.
137 Id. 3.
138 Hope, supra note 3, at 296-97.
139 See NEPAD, COUNTRY SELF-ASSESSMENT FOR THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW
MECHANISM 50, available at http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/156.pdf
[hereinafter COUNTRY SELF-ASSESSMENT].
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able to assess the performance of its government and to hold it
accountable for the implementation of appropriate policies.
To set these processes in motion, the APRM sends a
questionnaire out to participating countries. 140  The questionnaire
issued by the APRM elicits detailed information about the policies
and practices of the government in the areas of democracy and
political governance, economic governance and management,
corporate governance, and socio-economic development.' 4' The
answers supplied by the country are included in the APRM report
and put in the public domain, thereby providing information on
government operations and fostering public surveillance of
government operations. Transparency, coupled with the free flow
of ideas, makes government policies predictable and fosters
"efficient, customized, and effective policies."' 142
Allied with the APRM's goal of promoting transparency of
government policies and practices is the goal of promoting
accountability in the continent. 143 Africa's history of dictatorships
and ineffective governments is well known.1" Corruption looms
as a large problem in the continent because of the lack of
accountability of public officials.145  Corruption retards economic
140 Id.
141 African Peer Review Mechanism-Questionnaire, http://www.aprmnigeria.org/
apeer.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2006). The APRM invites reviewed countries to discuss
the questionnaire and to adapt it to their own particular conditions. During the Ghana
review, for example, the National Governing Council, the agency charged with the
responsibility of overseeing APRM reviews in Ghana, felt it necessary to incorporate
into the questionnaire issues related to taxation. See NAPRM, Report on National
Stakeholder Consultations: Implementing the APRM in GHANA, CHALLENGES AND
PROSPECTS 21, available at http://www.undp.org/agf/papers/Ghana%20Main%2OReport
%20on%20APRM%20for%20AGF%20VI.pdf.
142 Siegle, Weinstein, & Halperin, supra note 87, at 64.
143 Peer Review, supra note 22, 16 (noting that the APRM process will "promote
mutual accountability," thereby ensuring "compliance with best practice").
144 See, e.g., SAMUEL DECALO, PSYCHOSES OF POWER: AFRICAN PERSONAL
DICTATORSHIPS (1989).
145 See generally TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT
2006 (2006), available at http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download-gcr#
download (noting that health system corruption is less likely to occur in countries that
adhere to the rule of law, institute effective civil service codes, and put in place strong
accountability mechanisms).
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efficiency and operates as a "regressive tax" on the population. 14 6
In the African context, corruption is prevalent partly because the
institutional framework for holding public officials accountable
remains rudimentary or non-existent in most of the continent.
141
By compiling, digesting, and benchmarking the policies, practices,
and performance of governments on core governance issues, the
APRM will help illuminate areas of deficiency in public
accountability and equip civil society and pressure groups to
campaign to get the issues addressed. In this regard, the peer
review process will "provide the impetus for conscious efforts at
improving public accountability" across the continent.
148
Another key goal of the peer review process is that of capacity
building. 149  Peer reviews are usually a learning process for the
country under review, the reviewers, and for the peer participants.
This learning process is especially important in African countries,
many of which are not familiar with the process of benchmarking
and the use of objective criteria and quantitative indicators in
assessing the performance of governments. 15  In preparing for
APRM reviews, officials in these countries will acquire the skills
and competencies to do the kind of qualitative analysis required in
peer reviews. The learning curve will necessarily be steep. Public
institutions in Africa are often weak and many have a deserved
reputation for poor record keeping.' Preparing for peer reviews
will consequently be a challenging task for them. In the short run,
146 Kaufmann, supra note 75, at 85 (suggesting that this "regressive tax" is borne
disproportionately by the low-income groups who pay a significant part of their income
in bribes to obtain access to public services).
147 Some commentators have sought to internationalize the campaign against
corruption in Africa by seeking to elevate corruption to the status of a crime in
international law. See generally Paul Ocheje, Refocusing International Law on the Quest
for Accountability in Africa: The Case against the "Other" Impunity, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L
L. 749 (2002) (suggesting that corruption of public officials should be elevated to the
status of a crime in international law and that the International Criminal Court should be
given jurisdiction over such matters).
148 Hope, supra note 3, at 299.
149 See PAGANI, supra note 121, at 12 (suggesting that peer reviews are an important
capacity building instrument).
150 Hope, supra note 3, at 305.
151 John Stremlau, Nepad's Peer Review Mechanism Still Work in Progress,
BUSINESS DAY, Nov. 4, 2002, available at http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/
d0000132/index.php.
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weak institutions and poor record keeping will have a negative
effect on the quality, comprehensiveness, and accuracy of report
of the APRM. However, as competencies and record keeping
improve, the system should become more reliable. Nonetheless,
the financial difficulties facing NEPAD members make it difficult
to find the resources for conducting effective qualitative
analysis.'52 In this regard, it is noteworthy that foreign partners of
NEPAD and the African Union have pledged technical and other
support in assisting in the work of the APRM.'53
The APRM is also expected to contribute to greater policy
coherence in the continent. 154 This means that a more systematic
approach is expected to aid in the articulation of economic and
social policies, as is a more concerted effort to ensure proper
implementation of these government policies. Coherent economic
policies have not been the forte of African countries.155 Many
African countries have shifted between economic approaches
without clearly articulating the strategies underlying the shifts.'56
Even when principles were clearly articulated, as in the African
Charter for Popular Participation in Development and
Transformation, 5 7 they were often implemented poorly, if at all.
A key benefit of NEPAD is that it provides its members with a
coherent blueprint for economic and social development, 158 and it
152 See John Ohiohenuan, Nepad: Thinking Out of the Box 16, available at http://
www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000548/intro.php.
153 See NEPAD, ANNUAL REPORT 2003/2004 38-39, available at
http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/165.pdf#search=%22ADB%20NEPAD%20
REPORT%202004%22 (commenting on the support of partner institutions to the
APRM).
154 Hope, supra note 3, at 299.
155 Id.
156 See, e.g., DANI RODRIK, TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 46, available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/tpl.PDF (noting
that "trade reform in Africa has generally been erratic and marked by reversals and lack
of credibility.").
157 African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation
(1990), available at http://www.africanreview.org/docs/civsoc/arusha.pdf (adopted in
Arusha, Tanzania, Feb. 1990).
158 It should be noted that there remains some debate about whether the liberal
economic agenda adopted by NEPAD is the most effective strategy for promoting
economic growth on the continent.
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also provides a mechanism, the peer review mechanism, by which
member compliance is encouraged and measured. 5 9 NEPAD's
blueprint is a market-based strategy for promoting sustainable
development. 160 Peer monitoring of compliance will help "tip the
domestic political scales in favor of progressive, outward-looking
policy and against retrograde choices."'
' 6
'
Compliance with the NEPAD blueprint is facilitated by the
fact that each review report must propose an action plan for
addressing the problems and shortcomings identified during the
review process. 16 2  The country under review is required to
respond to the tentative findings of the review panel by proposing
a time-based plan of action for rectifying problem areas. 163  The
plan would enable members of the NEPAD and other stakeholders
to monitor the progress of the reviewed country.' 64 Where the
reviewed country has demonstrated a willingness to address the
identified problems, participating countries are committed to
"provide what assistance they can, as well as to urge donor
governments and agencies also to come to the assistance of the
country reviewed."' 65
As indicated above, NEPAD members expect that by
implementing policies conducive to good governance and by
instituting a system of peer monitoring of these policies, foreign
investors and governments will regain confidence in the economic
and political stability of the continent. 66 The mutual commitment
of NEPAD members to good governance and their agreement to
159 Peer Review, supra note 22, at [ 2.
160 See generally New Partnership, supra note 16.
161 Hope, supra note 3, at 299.
162 African Peer Review Mechanism, Organisation and Processes, 7.13,
NEPAD/HGSIC-3-2003/APRM/Guideline/O&P, Mar. 9, 2003, available at
http://nepad.org/2005/files/documents/48.pdf [hereinafter Organisation and Processes].
163 Peer Review, supra note 22, 21. According to the APRM Peer Review, the
government under review is required to discuss the draft report of the review and "to put
forward its own views on how the identified shortcomings may be addressed." Id.
These responses are added to the report of the review team. Id.
164 Organisation and Processes, supra note 162, 7.19.
165 NEPAD, African Peer Review Mechanism, 1 1, AHG/235(XXXVIII) Annex 2,
http://nepad.org/2005/files/documents/49.pdf.
166 Hope, supra note 3, at 303-04.
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peer review each other represent one branch of the NEPAD
partnership.167 The other branch of the partnership is that between
NEPAD members and the international community. 168  This
second branch is built around foreign support and assistance to
promote the realization of the goals of the first partnership. In a
sense, the APRM is also a means of signaling to the international
community the seriousness of African countries in their
commitment to good governance. In return, foreign assistance and
aid is expected. 1
69
Some commentators have argued that this expectation of
foreign assistance may be unrealistic.17° It remains to be seen
whether a vigorous implementation of the NEPAD agenda and an
effective use of the APRM will increase more foreign investment
and aid to Africa. In any event, whether or not foreign assistance
materializes, the APRM process will be an indisputable success if
it succeeds in its broader objective of promoting good governance
in the continent. While foreign investment and assistance will be
beneficial in providing the capital required for rebuilding the
economies of African countries, governance alone will go a long
way in setting the foundation necessary for sustainable economic
and social development of a long suffering continent. The benefits
of experience-sharing, peer learning, and peer pressure-
components of the APRM regime-will resonate whether or not
foreign assistance materializes.
III. The Review Process
To properly assess the potential of the APRM, it is crucial to
understand the process for conducting reviews and the criteria
used by the APRM in conducting reviews. This part examines the
institutional framework of the APRM and the stages involved in
an APRM review. The next part considers the criteria used for
evaluating the performance of countries.
The review process of the APRM has four organizational
167 New Partnership, supra note 16, IT 47, 49.
168 Id. 48.
169 Id. at I 62, 66.
170 See, e.g., Jakkie Cilliers, NEPAD's Peer Review Mechanism 1 (Institute for
Security Studies, Issue Paper, Nov. 2002), available at http://www.iss.co.za/
Pubs/Papers/64/paper 64.pdf.
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components: the Committee of Participating Heads of State and
Government (APR Forum), the Panel of Eminent Persons (APR
Panel), Country Review Team (APR Team), and the APRM
Secretariat.'71  Each component has a defined set of
responsibilities in the implementation of the review process. 172
A. The APR Forum
The APR Forum is the plenary decision-making body with the
ultimate responsibility of defining the objectives of the review
process, stipulating the review process, conducting reviews, and
monitoring the implementation of review reports.'73 The APR
Forum is comprised of those heads of state and governments of
member states of the African Union whose countries have acceded
the APRM regime. 174 The APR Forum receives and discusses
review reports and communicates its recommendations to the
government of the reviewed country."' The forum is expected to
use peer dialogue and persuasion, including the offer of assistance
and the use of other appropriate measures, to encourage the
reviewed country to implement the suggested changes. 176 The
forum is also required to publicize review reports '77 as a way of
promoting civic discussion of the challenges facing the reviewed
country and of bringing public pressure on the reviewed country to
implement the recommended reforms. Recognizing that foreign
assistance may be needed for the implementation of panel
recommendations, the APR Forum is also charged with the
responsibility of persuading foreign partners to contribute to the
implementation of reforms "by providing technical and financial
assistance."' 178
171 Organisation and Processes, supra note 162.
172 See id. (outlining the responsiblities of the review process components).
173 Id. T[ 2. 1.
174 Id.
175 Id. T 2.2.
176 Id. T 2.2(d).
177 Id. T 2.2(g).
178 Organisation and Processes, supra note 162, 2.2(e).
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B. The APR Panel
The primary purpose of the APR Panel is to oversee the conduct of
the APRM."7 9 The panel is also responsible for ensuring the
credibility and integrity of the review process. 80 Panel members,
who are to be Africans of "high moral stature and demonstrated
commitment to the ideals of Pan-Africanism,"' 8' are required to
have distinguished records in "areas of political governance,
macro-economic management, public financial management and
corporate governance.' 1 82  They are to be nominated by
participating countries and appointed by the AFR Forum. 183 To
guarantee confidence and trust in the review process, the
composition of the APR Panel is required to reflect a "broad
regional balance, gender equity[,] and cultural diversity."' 184
Because even a talented body of eminent persons may be faced
with issues outside the areas of competence of its members, the
APR Panel is to have access to a pool of technical experts. 85 As a
body comprised of reputable Africans with distinguished records
of professional accomplishments, the APR Panel is expected to
ensure that the review process is professional, credible, and
efficient. 86  The APR Panel appoints APR teams to conduct
country reviews and to report their findings. 187  The panel is
required to assess the recommendations contained in team
reports188 and make recommendations to the APR Forum on the
179 Peer Review, supra note 22, 6.
180 Id. 10.
181 Organisation and Processes, supra note 162, 3.6. See generally P.
Olisanwuche Esedebe, PAN-AFRICANISM: THE IDEA AND MOVEMENT 1776-1991 (2nd ed.,
1994) (discussing the origins and impact of Pan-Africanism on the African continent).
182 Peer Review, supra note 22, 1 7.
183 Id.
184 Organisation and Processes, supra note 162, 3.6.
185 The list of technical experts is to be compiled through a competitive process.
Since one of the goals of the APRM process is capacity building in Africa, the APR
Panel is required to use African technical experts where possible. Organisation and
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best strategies for implementing them. 8 9 Since membership of
country review teams varies from case to case, the APR Panel,
whose members serve for terms of up to four years and retire by
rotation, ensures the consistency of standards applied in country
reviews and provides quality control over the operations of the
APRM. In addition to this oversight responsibility, the panel is
required to facilitate the implementation of country reports by
making recommendations to the APR Forum regarding "measures
that could be taken to assist the [reviewed] country in the
improvement of its governance and socio-economic development
performance."' 9 ° Consistent with the rationale of the peer review
process, "the recommendations of the [APR] Panel are not meant
to punish or exclude countries," but to assist participating
countries to "identify [their] own weaknesses, and to find ways
and means of addressing them."' 9'
C. The APR Team
Before acceding to the APRM, a country is required to outline
a time-bound Programme of Action for implementing the
"Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic[,] and Corporate
Governance."' 92 The APR team conducts actual in-country review
of participating countries is to determine compliance with core
commitments and to suggest improvements.' 93  The Team
examines the progress made by the reviewed country in
implementing the Declaration.' 94 The Team is required to visit the
reviewed country to verify background information, obtain the
contribution of stakeholders, discuss the implementation of the
country's plan of action, and address identified weaknesses and
shortcomings in the agreed areas of governance and
189 Id. 3.1(e).
190 Id. [ 3.1(f).
191 Stals, supra note 24.
192 Peer Review, supra note 22, 13.
193 NEPAD, GUIDELINES FOR COUNTRIES TO PREPARE FOR AND TO PARTICIPATE IN
THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM 42 (2003), available at http:/lnepad
.org/2005/files/aprm/aprmguidelinesforcountryreview200104final.pdf [hereinafter
GUIDELINES].
194 Hope, supra note 3, at 292.
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development.1 95 During the country visit, the Team must consult
extensively with government officials, agencies, and civil society
organizations in the country.1 96 The Team must also assess the
good faith attempts of the country to comply with core
commitments, note difficulties encountered by the country in its
compliance efforts, and request suggestions from both the
government and civil society on how further compliance could be
facilitated.' 97  The extensive consultation with government
officials and agencies in the reviewed country is intended to
provide the country with an adequate opportunity to explain its
efforts to meet the core goals and to share its experiences on the
journey toward good governance. These extensive consultations
with African experts and institutions are also helpful in assuring
the reviewed country of the credibility of the process. Moreover,
broad consultation ensures that participating countries are at the
center of finding solutions to their social and economic
problems.19
8
In conducting technical reviews, the team relies on technical
experts, partner institutions of the APRM,' 99 and other units of the
African Union.20 0  The use of partner institutions is aimed at
195 GUIDELINES, supra note 193, 45.
196 Id. 44. The APR Team is required to "carry out the widest possible range of
consultations with government officials, political parties, parliamentarians, and
representatives of civil society organizations (including the media, academia, trade
unions, business and professional bodies)." Id.
197 Id. 23, 45.
198 See Press Release, NEPAD News, supra note 59, at 2. Bernard Kouassi, the
Executive Director of the APRM, has noted that "[n]ational ownership and leadership by
the participating country are essential factors underpinning the effectiveness of the
APRM." Id.
199 These institutions are to conduct technical assessments of the country under
review. Organisation and Processes, supra note 162, 6.1.
200 It should be remembered that the APRM is a program of the AU and
participation of other units of the AU in the review process would ensure that the full
complement of expertise and skills available in the AU is used to achieve the goal of
effective and efficient peer reviews. The APRM envisages the participation of organs of
the AU, such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Conference
on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, and the African
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of Children. Organisation and
Processes, supra note 162, T 6.3. The involvement of organs of the AU in the review
process would also help reduce the possibility of unnecessary duplication of resources
and efforts in the monitoring of governance issues in the continent. Id.
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encouraging broader institutional participation in the peer review
mechanism. For example, the APRM has designated the United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) to conduct
technical assessment in the area of economic governance and
management and the African Development Bank (ADB) in the
area of banking.2"' The ECA and the ADB both have long track
records for excellence in their respective areas of competence, and
their participation in the APRM will strengthen the
professionalism of the review process as well as lend credence to
the integrity and reliability of the process.
D. The APRM Secretariat
The APRM Secretariat provides "secretarial, technical,
coordinating and administrative support services for the
APRM. 2 °2 It prepares background documents for the country
reviews, mobilizes and facilitates the provision of technical
assistance to the countries under review, and monitors the progress
of technical assessments. z 3 In coordinating the operation of the
APRM, the Secretariat is expected to "work with a wide range of
Partner institutions, including those that set international
standards, oversight institutions, [and] African research and policy
institutions engaged in policy advisory services. ' 2°
There are five stages to the peer review process. Stage One
consists of using background documents prepared by the
Secretariat and materials supplied by national, regional, and
international organizations to examine the economic and corporate
governance and development climate in the country.2°5 The
Secretariat is required to gather the following: relevant documents
on the country under review, self-assessments done by the
country, assessment reports on the country prepared by regional
and international organizations, and other reviews of the country
conducted by recognized bodies. 20 6  The Secretariat is also
201 Id. T 6.2.
202 Id. T 4.1.
203 Id. 4.2.
204 Id. T 6.6.
205 Peer Review, supra note 22, T 18.
206 GUIDELINES, supra note 193, 21.
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required to send a questionnaire to the country under review
eliciting information on the review areas.20 7 The goal is to gather
sufficient background documents to enable the Secretariat to write
a "background document" on the country.2 8 In writing the
background document, the Secretariat is expected to draw from
reports or studies done by relevant international organizations.2 9
For example, the Secretariat is expected to extract information
from reports completed by the ECA Governance Project, which
has issued country studies on the state of governance in several
African countries. 210  Reliance on these international documents,
especially those drafted by African institutions and organs of the
AU, will help avoid unnecessary duplications of effort and also
reduce the compliance burden on reviewed countries in responding
to requests from different bodies.
Drawing on the background document and the Programme of
Action 211 supplied by the country under review, the Secretariat has
to prepare an "issues paper" outlining the challenges facing the
country under review.212 The issues paper, which is to guide the
country review process, is shared with the APR Partner
Institutions and the country under review.213  This limited
circulation enables both the reviewed country and the partners to
comment on the content of the paper and clarify or elaborate
207 Id. at 111.2. The review areas are "Democracy and Political Governance,
Economic Governance and Management, Corporate Governance, and Socio-Economic
Development." Id. The country uses the questionnaire as a basis for its self-assessment
of performance in the review areas.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, supra note 115. The country
studies measure the performance of the countries based on more than eighty indicators
focusing on political representation and rights, institutional effectiveness, and economic
management and governance. Id.
211 Each participating state is required to outline a Programme of Action for
implementing the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate
Governance. Peer Review, supra note 22, 13. Furthermore, a country that has
completed its self-assessment in preparation for a review is required to develop "a
preliminary Programme of Action building on existing policies, programmes, and
projects." GUIDELINES, supra note 193, 111.3.
212 Organisation and Processes, supra note 162, 7.5(d).
213 Id.
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issues that are of concern to them. After circulating the issues
paper, the Secretariat drafts and circulates a plan for the visit of
the APR Team.214
Stage Two is the Country Review Visit.215 Before this stage,
the APR Team should have reviewed the background documents,
the issues paper, the Programme of Action submitted by the
country under review, and other documents collected by the
Secretariat. The team then travels to the reviewed country for
consultations with public officials, private sector, and civil society
organizations. 216 These consultations provide an opportunity for
stakeholders to give feedback to the team on the country's
progress and shortcomings in its journey toward good
governance. 217  These consultations should enable the team to
reach a "consensus with the stakeholders on the remaining issues
or challenge areas and the steps that need to be taken to address
them.2 18
During Stage Three, the APR Team prepares a report
summarizing its findings and analyzing the implications of these
findings for the country's governance and socio-economic
development. 19  In the report, the country's performance is
measured against "the applicable political, economic and corporate
governance commitments" it made during earlier stages in the
process.220 Before submitting its final report, the APR Team is
required to discuss its draft report with the country under review,
with the objective of ensuring its accuracy and providing the
government with an opportunity to respond to the team's findings
by suggesting how the identified shortcomings will be
addressed.2
In its final report, the APR team is required to indicate whether
214 Id. T 7.5(e).
215 GUIDELINES, supra note 193, 22.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Organisation and Processes, supra note 162, T 7.11.
219 Id. 17.12.
220 Peer Review, supra note 22, 20.
221 Organisation and Processes, supra note 162, 7.14. The response of the country
to the draft report is appended to the final report of the team. Id.
2006]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
the reviewed country has expressed the intention to take corrective
measures. The team must also state what resources are needed for
the effective implementation of the corrective measures and
indicate how long it will take for the country to implement the
measures. 2 2  Team reports must contain specific measures to
address the shortcomings and will include a time frame for their
implementation.2 23  These measures are to be included in the
reviewed country's Programme of Action. 4 The stipulation of
time-bound corrective measures should facilitate periodic
assessments of the compliance of the reviewed country with
promises and commitments made during the review.225
Stage Four involves the submission of the Team report to the
APR Panel and then to the APR Forum for consideration and
adoption. In adopting the report, the forum will decide the steps
necessary for implementation.226 Because the APRM is a system
of peer monitoring and support, it is expected that participating
countries will assist the reviewed country in implementing the
report, and where necessary, seek foreign assistance on its
behalf.227 To reinforce the mutual learning and capacity building
goals of the APRM, the APR Panel and the senior official of the
participating countries are expected to meet to discuss Team
reports and exchange ideas on the lessons learned from the process
and canvass suggestions for improving the operation of the
process.228
Stage Five, the final stage of the review process, involves
publicizing the Team report and decisions of the APR Panel and
the APR Forum on the report by putting them in the public
domain.229 The report and decisions are also to be formally tabled
222 Peer Review, supra note 22, T 22. With regard to the resources needed to
implement the corrective measures, the report should indicate how much the government
itself can provide and "how much is to come from external sources." Id.
223 Organisation and Processes, supra note 162, 7.13.
224 Id.
225 See Organisation and Processes, supra note 162, 7.19 (detailing the follow-up
stage of the APRM).
226 Id. [7.15.
227 Peer Review, supra note 22, 1 24.
228 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, supra note 115.
229 Organisation and Processes, supra note 162, T 7.17.
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at "key regional and sub-regional structures such as the Summit of
the African Union, the Pan-African Parliament, the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Peace and
Security Council[,] and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council
(ECOSOC) of the African union., 230 By putting the report and
decisions in the public domain and by tabling them at key regional
and sub-regional groups, public attention would be drawn to the
findings of the APRM. Public pressure will also be brought to
bear on the implementation of the recommendations. Moreover,
the engagement of regional and sub-regional groups means that
there is a larger forum, outside the APRM, for oversight of the
steps being taken by the reviewed country to comply with the
APRM recommendations.
APRM oversight of the implementation procedure is facilitated
by the requirement that corrective measures recommended by the
APR team should be detailed enough to become time-bound.23'
Furthermore, it is envisioned that reports, and decisions based on
them, will suggest a date for review of the progress made by the
reviewed country in implementing the recommendations.232
During this follow-up period, the Secretariat is expected to assist
the government of the reviewed country with capacity building
and resource mobilization necessary to implement the report.233
IV. Measuring Performance
Participants in NEPAD and the APRM are committed to
coordinating policies. They are also committed to individually
adopting laws, programs, and standards that would help realize
their mutual goals in four core areas: democracy and good political
governance, economic governance and management, corporate
governance, and socio-economic development.234 These core
areas are those in which African countries have performed poorly.
They are also areas that are commonly viewed as necessary to the
230 Id. T 7.17
231 Id. T 7.13.
232 Id. T 7.19
233 Id.
234 NEPAD, DECLARATION ON DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 6 (2005), available at http://www.nepad.org/20O5/files/documents/2.pdf
[hereinafter DECLARATION].
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revitalization of the continent.2 5 By committing to improvements
in these essential areas, African countries have demonstrated an
initial commitment to reversing the continent's reputation of
mismanagement and poor governance.
To give impetus to the commitment, NEPAD has devised
indicators for measuring the performance of countries in the four
core areas.2 3 6 One of the basic objectives of the APRM is to help
participating states, through mutual assistance and peer pressure,
in adopting and implementing the mutually agreed policies and
programs in these four core areas. 237 Through its periodic reviews
of participating countries, the APRM is able to monitor and
publicize its findings on the level of compliance of each
participant with the stipulated indicative standards. 238 This sharing
of information about compliance with the indicative standards will
enable participating countries to "encourage and support each
other and exercise constructive peer dialogue and persuasion
where necessary to ensure that all countries achieve full
compliance" with agreed practices and standards.239
The aforementioned four core areas are the main ones that
African countries have had difficulty tackling.24 °  African
countries have therefore recognized the need to implement
effective policies and practices in these clusters of issues that have
adversely affected the quality of life of the people of the
continent. 24' The following is a discussion of how the APRM
assesses performance in these four core areas.
235 See generally Nyikuli, supra note 92.
236 See Indicators, supra note 109 (indicating the standards).
237 Peer Review, supra note 22, 3.
238 See APRM, Country Review Report of the Republic of Ghana, at 129-34 (June
2005), http://www.hss.de/downloads/Aprm-country-report.pdf. For example, in its
review of Ghana the APRM noted that while Ghana was committed to improved
governance it needed to address several issues to ensure compliance with the objectives
of NEPAD and the APRM. These issues include capacity constraints, gender equity,
corruption, unemployment, and external dependency. Id.
239 Indicators, supra note 109, 1.4. NEPAD also envisages that the sharing of
information will promote "mutual learning in areas of high priority in NEPAD such as
strengthening institutions of democracy and human rights, improving budgeting and
financial management, fighting corruption[.]" Id. 1.6.
240 See generally Nyikuli, supra note 92.
241 Indicators, supra note 109, 1 1.1-1,8.
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A. Democracy and Political Governance
In its framework document, NEPAD acknowledged that
"development is impossible in the absence of true democracy,
respect for human rights, peace, and good governance. '242
NEPAD's democracy and political governance initiative is
consequently aimed at strengthening the political and
administrative systems of participating countries by emphasizing
democratic values, accountability, transparency, the rule of law,
and respect for human rights.243  These elements of liberal
societies are largely underdeveloped on the African continent.
Their cultivation will help in creating systems of accountable
governments and in building functional societies in which
individuals have the freedom and security to actualize their full
potentials.
The key objectives of the participating countries in the area of
democracy and governance are to enshrine constitutional
democracy, promote human rights (with particular emphasis on
the rights of women and children), fight corruption, and uphold the
separation of powers, including the independence of the
judiciary.2' As a consequence, NEPAD emphasizes the creation
of liberal democracies.245  It does so by enshrining three
components of its democratic agenda. First, NEPAD recognizes
the importance of "constitutionally established provisions and
institutions which enable citizens to enjoy their rights and freedom
of membership of political associations of their choosing and free
participation of these political groups and other associations in
open political competition."246 Second, NEPAD acknowledges the
importance of the rule of law in ensuring that "individuals are
subject to and treated equally according to the law, and that no one
is exposed to arbitrary treatment by the state[.] ' 247 Third, NEPAD
requires that participating countries promote "economic, social,
cultural, civil, and political liberties" which will ensure the
242 New Partnership, supra note 16, 79.
243 Indicators, supra note 109, 2.2.
244 Id.
245 See DECLARATION, supra note 234.
246 COUNTRY SELF-ASSESSMENT, supra note 139, at 18.
247 Id. at 18-19.
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protection of the integrity and rights of citizens.248
Therefore, under NEPAD and the APRM project it is
insufficient for a country to demonstrate that it operates a
democratic government; the country also has to demonstrate that it
respects the rule of law and confers internationally recognized
freedoms and liberties upon its citizens.249  This commendable
emphasis on liberal democracy is particularly important in Africa,
where ethnic and other minorities have often "borne the brunt of
the conflicts raging" across the continent. 2 0 To further strengthen
human rights protection and help promote a pro-growth
environment, the participating countries are committed to
improving the independence of the judiciary.25' In terms of
political governance, the key objectives are to foster accountability
and efficiency of governments and to fight corruption.252
To assist the APRM in assessing performance in the area of
democracy and political governance, participating countries are
required to indicate their compliance with stipulated standards and
codes approved by African countries, these include the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1990), the UN
Declaration on Human Rights (1948), the Conference of Security,
Stability, Development and Cooperation (CSSDCA) Solemn
Declaration (2000), the United and African Union anti-corruption
codes, and the NEPAD Framework Document.253 Participating
countries are required to answer specific questions on each of the
objectives of the democracy and governance initiative and submit
evidence supporting their implementation of the agreed-upon
standards.254 For example, with regard to fighting corruption in
the political sphere, members are asked whether they have
established "independent and effective institutions, mechanisms[,]
248 Id. at 19.
249 See DECLARATION, supra note 234, 7.
250 DECLARATION, supra note 234, 10. The signatories pledged their undertaking
"to do more to advance the cause of human rights in Africa generally and, specifically, to
end the moral shame exemplified by the plight of women, children, the disabled and
ethnic minorities in conflict situations in Africa." Id.
251 Id. T 7.
252 Indicators, supra note 109, 2.2.
253 New Partnership, supra note 16.
254 See Indicators, supra note 109, TT 2.3-2.11.3.
[Vol. XXXHl
IMPROVING GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA
and processes for combating corruption," whether "there are
precedents for dealing effectively with proven cases of
corruption," and whether "there are measures for enhancing
integrity and probity in public life[.],, 255 Examples of the kind of
indicators that would be acceptable to the APRM in establishing
that a member is taking active steps to combat corruption include,
the requirement of periodic and publicly available asset
declarations by senior public officials, and the accessibility of
parliamentary proceedings and reports of parliamentary
committees. 6
B. Economic Governance and Management
The economic difficulties faced by African countries have both
internal and external dimensions. The external dimensions include
structural impediments to economic African economic growth
such as unfavorable terms of trade.257 The APRM, however,
focuses on what African countries can do to address the internal
dimensions of the socio-economic and political problems 8.25  The
internal dimensions include poor economic policies and
infrastructure, unpredictable public administrations, unfriendly
business environments, inefficient financial sectors, and non-
transparent pubic financial management. 9
African countries recognize that the "the promotion of market
efficiency, control of wasteful spending.... and the
encouragement of private financial flows are critical aspects of the
quest to reduce poverty and enhance sustainable development on
the continent.2 6 ° Consequently, as a means of addressing the
internal dimensions of their problems, participating countries of
the APRM are committed to implementing "a set of concrete and
time bound programmes aimed at enhancing the quality of
economic and public financial management" in African
255 Id. T 2.8.2.
256 Id. T[ 2.8.3.
257 New Partnership, supra note 16, T 34.
258 See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 135, 8.
259 COUNTRY SELF-ASSESSMENT, supra note 139, at 42.
260 Id. at41.
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countries.2 6' The goal is to lay the foundations for macro-
economic stability, transparency, and efficient economic
management of African countries.262
To this end, participating countries have agreed to abide by
certain internationally recognized standards and codes designed to
promote good economic management.2 63 These include the Code
of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial
Policy, the Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency,
Guidelines for Public Debt Management, Core Principles for
Effective Banking Supervision, and the Best Practices for Budget
Transparency." In addition to demonstrating compliance with
relevant codes, participating countries are required to provide
evidence that indicates the steps they have taken to realize the
broad objectives of the economic governance and management
initiative.265 Acceptable indicators of progress being made in this
area include those illustrating the autonomy and effectiveness of
the national auditing body, the autonomy of the Central Bank, the
enforcement of effective competition regulation, and the drafting
of medium-term economic planning instruments.266
C. Corporate Governance
The principal-agent problem that arises in the context of
ensuring that government officials conduct the affairs of the state
in the interest of the governed also arises in the corporate context.
The personal interests of those who run corporations sometimes
diverge with the interest of the shareholders, stakeholders, and the
communities in which these corporations do business.
Government regulation is typically used to address this problem.
Corporate governance is usually defined in two senses. First,
corporate governance is the actual behavior of corporations in
terms of their performance and their treatment of shareholders and
261 New Partnership, supra note 16, 88.
262 COUNTRY SELF-ASSESSMENT, supra note 139, at 42.
263 DECLARATION, supra note 234, 18.
264 Id.
265 Indicators, supra note 109, 3.2.
266 Id. 3.3.3.
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other stakeholders.267 Second, corporate governance is the body of
rules and regulations under which firms operate. 268 The APRM
process is concerned mainly with corporate governance in the
second sense. 269 APRM corporate governance regime focuses on
the process by which corporations are regulated, controlled, and
held accountable.2 70 The focus is not only on formal government
regulation of corporations as such, but also on non-government
regulatory authorities such as stock exchanges, and professional
and trade associations.27' It also emphasizes the goal of aligning
"'as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations,
and society within a framework of sound governance and common
good., 272 The goal is to create a business environment in which
corporations are transparent regarding their management process,
accountable to their shareholders, environmentally friendly, and
behave responsibly toward stakeholders, including employees,
customers, and the communities in which they do business. 73
In the African context, the implementation of effective
corporate governance principles will provide a safeguard "against
corruption and mismanagement, promoting transparency in
economic life and attracting more domestic and foreign
investment. ' 274 The expectation of participating countries is that
improved corporate governance, together with broader
implementation of economic and political reforms, will enhance
the confidence of businesses and investors in the economies of
African countries. It is remarkable that despite the increased
international movement of capital in the global economy, foreign
investment in African countries remains minimal even when
compared with foreign investments in other parts of the
267 See Stijn Claessens, Corporate Governance and Development 4 (World Bank
Working Paper Series, Oct. 2003), abstract available at http://ssm.com/abstract=64272 1.
268 Id.
269 Indicators, supra note 109, 4.1.
270 COUNTRY SELF-ASSESSMENT, supra note 139, at 59.
271 See id. at 66.
272 Indicators, supra note 109, 14.1.
273 COUNTRY SELF-ASSESSMENT, supra note 139, at 59.
274 Charles Okeahalam, Corporate Governance and Disclosure in Africa: Issues and
Challenges, 12 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 359, 368 (2004).
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developing world.275  While poor economic and corporate
governance do not entirely explain the paucity of foreign
investments in the continent, the strengthening of these areas
would contribute to the process of putting African countries on the
map as desirable places for investment.
It should be reiterated, however, that the corporate governance
initiative of the APRM attempts to balance the profit motive of
corporations with the need for corporations to be socially
responsible actors in the communities in which they do business.
276
By requiring implementation of standards on safe working
conditions, fair wages, employee rights, and shareholder rights, for
example, NEPAD countries can demonstrate a commitment to
building business friendly economies in which corporations are
responsive to the needs of the communities in which they conduct
business.
To measure compliance of participating countries with the
corporate governance initiative, reviewed countries are required to
address a wide range of issues in their self-assessment
questionnaire.277 These include an assessment of the clarity and
coherence of the national laws on corporate behavior as well as an
assessment of the role of their judiciaries in resolving commercial
disputes and in prosecuting corporate infringements.278
Furthermore, they are required to describe how their labor laws
protect the right to unionize, to outline the procedures for
resolving labor disputes, and to assess the level of corporate
compliance with labor and human rights laws.279 In terms of the
protection of shareholder rights, countries under review are
required to provide information on the rights and powers of
shareholders, on the mechanisms for ensuring equitable treatment
of all classes of shareholders, and on shareholder remedies and
effectiveness thereof.280
275 Anupam Basu & Krishna Srinivasan, Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Some
Case Studies 4 (1MF Working Paper No. 02/61, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp0261 .pdf.
276 Indicators, supra note 109, 4.1.
277 COUNTRY SELF-ASSESSMENT, supra note 139, at 59-75.
278 Id. at 66.
279 Id. at 67.
280 Id. at 72.
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D. Socio-Economic Development
It should be reiterated that the overriding objective of the
NEPAD project is to promote social and economic development in
Africa. 28' Socio-economic and political reforms are the strategies
for accomplishing this objective.282 The APRM is one of the
means by which NEPAD and the AU assess the progress being
made by member states in this connection.283 It necessarily
follows that some of the indicators considered during peer reviews
should be those that measure how well participating countries are
doing in "designing appropriate policies and delivery mechanisms
in key social development areas. ' ' 284 In assessing the progress of
members in the area of socio-economic development, the APRM
takes into account such issues as whether the country is fostering
self-reliance and building capacity for self-sustaining
development, working toward gender equality, encouraging broad-
based civic participation in development by stakeholders, and
providing affordable access to water, energy, and other resources
to its citizens.285
The emphasis on self-reliance in development activities is due
to the underlying goal of NEPAD to put Africans at the center of
the solution to the problems facing the continent.286 Ultimately,
the intention is to reverse the long history of excessive reliance on
external assistance by emphasizing what African nations can do
for themselves. 287  Although NEPAD countries recognize the
importance of foreign assistance in African economic
reconstruction, the long term objective is to reduce the reliance of
African countries on foreign assistance while at the same time
281 Id. at 76-77
282 Id. at 77.
283 See New Partnership, supra note 16, 1.
284 COUNTRY SELF-ASSESSMENT, supra note 139, at 76.
285 Id.
286 See New Partnership, supra note 16, 7 ("Africans declare that we will no
longer allow ourselves to be conditioned by circumstances. We will determine our own
destiny and call on the rest of the world to complement our efforts."). NEPAD members
also emphasized that the NEPAD initiative is based on African countries regaining
ownership and management of their economic destiny. See id. 47.
287 See id. 49.
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encouraging foreign investments.288 To this end, countries under
review are required to provide information on the percentages of
their national budgets that originate from external sources and also
to evaluate their dependence on foreign aid in terms of their total
debt ratio to gross domestic product and the total debt service ratio
to exports.289
The focus on gender equality is born out of a realization of the
state of gender relations in the continent.2 9 Female participation
in public and economic life has been minimal in relation to their
percentage of the continent's population.2 1  Although gender
equality in Africa is gradually improving, African women have
historically suffered from marginalization in terms of their legal
rights,292 educational opportunities, 293 participation in public life,
294
and participation in economic life.295 This has had an adverse
effect both on the material conditions of African women and also
on the overall economy of the continent. 296  To redress this
situation, part of the commitment made by NEPAD countries is to
work toward gender equality, in particular in providing equal
access to education for both genders. 297  To measure progress in
288 See Letter from Jubilee Debt Campaign to Prime Minister Tony Blair, supra note
50 (cautioning against excessive reliance on foreign assistance).
289 COUNTRY SELF-ASSESSMENT, supra note 139, at 81.
290 DECLARATION, supra note 234, 22.
291 See Aili Tripp, The New Political Activism in Africa, 12 J. DEMOCRACY 141
(2001) (discussing the historical trends in African women's participation in politics).
292 See, e.g., Adrien Wing & Eunice Carvalho, Black South African Women: Toward
Equal Rights, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 60 (1995) (discussing the historical legal
discrimination against women, particularly black women, in Africa).
293 See, e.g,, Alastair Matheson, Overcoming Tribal Prejudices against Educating
Girls in Kenya, 23 J. NEGRO EDUC. 481 (1954) (discussing the disparities in educational
opportunities between girls and boys in Kenya).
294 See Jean F. O'Barr, Making the Invisible Visible: African Women in Politics and
Policy, AFR. STUD. REv., Dec. 1975, at 19 (discussing the roles that women play in
African politics and the dismissive attitudes held by both political scientists and
policymakers toward women).
295 See Jeffrey Meeker & Dominique Meekers, The Precarious Socio-Economic
Position of Women in Rural Africa: The Case of the Kaguru of Tanzania, AFR. STUD.
REv., Apr. 1997, at 35 (discussing the limited access of women to economic resources).
296 See DECLARATION, supra note 234, IT 10, 11.
297 Indicators, supra note 109, 5.
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this regard, the APRM requires that countries supply evidence of
the legal, policy, and institutional steps they have taken to promote
and encourage gender equality. 298  They are also required to
provide evidence of the specific targets they have set toward
gender equality in key areas of concern. 299  Finally, they are
required to provide evidence of participation of women in key
economic and social areas and evidence of gender ratios across all
levels of education.30 ° In its review of Ghana, the APRM noted
that the country's progress on the socio-economic front was
distorted by a "lack of progress in gender mainstreaming as a
result of cultural and other impediments. 3 0 ' It recommended
concerted efforts "at individual, local[,] and national levels to
ensure that all practices of gender discrimination are tackled with
greater resolution and eliminated as soon as possible. 30 2
Active participation of stakeholders, including the private
sector, civil society, and the media, is obviously necessary for the
realization of the socio-economic development agenda of NEPAD.
In their Framework Document, NEPAD members noted that one
of the reasons for the economic underdevelopment of the continent
was that "African governments did not empower their peoples to
embark on development initiatives to realize their creative
potentials. '"30 3 Broad-based participation of stakeholders enables
the governments to obtain feedback from the people at the
grassroots level, including those who are usually the most directly
affected by government policies. Grassroots feedback provides
insight on both the economic and social challenges facing the
society and effective solutions to them. The more responsive the
government is to the legitimate concerns of stakeholders, the more
likely it is to enact policies that promote the common good.
NEPAD members have committed themselves to encouraging
effective participation of stakeholders in the development
process.3" Also, during the APRM process, reviewed countries
298 COUNTRY SELF-ASSESSMENT, supra note 139, at 84-85.
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 APRM, Country Review Report of the Republic of Ghana, supra note 238, at xxi.
302 Id. at 140.
303 New Partnership, supra note 16, 23.
304 COUNTRY SELF-ASSESSMENT, supra note 139, at 5.
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are required to provide evidence of legal, policy, and institutional
measures that they have taken in this regard and to self-assess the
effectiveness of these measures in ensuring broad-based
participation.0 5
V. Obstacles and Prospects
A new development ethic is emerging in Africa. No longer
satisfied with merely blaming historical and external factors for
their continent's problems, African leaders are beginning to
assume primary responsibility and leadership in finding solutions
to these problems. NEPAD's emphasis on local responsibility for
launching Africa on the path to economic and social development
is not intended to minimize the external conditions that adversely
affect the progress of the continent. 6  Rather, it is aimed at
bringing into sharper relief the domestic steps that the people of
the continent need to take as part of a broader strategy for
sustainable development.30 7
NEPAD members have been bold in acknowledging that the
primary impulse for development has to come from within the
continent.3 8 While they expect complementary support from
foreign partners, they have put Africans at the forefront of the
African renaissance. No longer will it be sufficient to bemoan the
external factors that retard the progress of the continent while
authoritarian African leaders run "patronage governments" that are
unconcerned with the material welfare of their citizens. 309  No
305 Id. at 86.
306 See New Partnership, supra note 16, 21. NEPAD acknowledged the role of
colonialism in subverting traditional structures, institutions and values in Africa, and in
retarding "the development of an entrepreneurial class, as well as middle class with skills
and managerial capacity." Id.
307 See id. 49.
308 See, e.g., Nancy Birdstall, Dani Rodrik & Arvind Subramanian, How to Help
Poor Countries, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2005, at 136 (discussing an increasing
realization that the rate of development in poor countries is often determined by the
policies of these countries, and that outsider can only play a limited role).
309 Francis M. Deng, African Policy Agenda: A Framework for Global Partnership,
in AFRICAN RECKONING: A QUEST FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE 153 (Francis M. Deng &
Terrence Lyons, eds., 1998) (contrasting "patronage governments" in Africa with
"policy governments" in Europe, and noting that in patronage governments there is
usually "a strong pressure on elected politicians to become benefactors to their kin-group
or ethnic constituencies.").
[Vol. XXXII
IMPROVING GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA
longer will it be acceptable for African leaders to hold out their
hands for foreign assistance while they exhibit reluctance to take
the steps necessary for creating functional and working societies.
There are those who express the fear that the policies
embodied in the NEPAD initiative and the peer review process
may gradually become conditions for receiving official
development assistance from the West.31° Such aid has proven to
be a crucial part of the war against poverty in many African
nations."' It is likely that foreign donors will gradually begin to
condition foreign assistance to the recipient African countries
committing themselves to implementing governance reforms and
participating in the peer monitoring of their progress. Implicit in
the partnership NEPAD members forged with the international
community was the expectation that if Africa implemented
policies promoting transparency, democracy, and good
governance, a greater amount of foreign aid will flow into the
continent.1
It is not surprising that foreign donors have expectations about
how the funds they provide will be used and about the quality of
governance in the countries they support financially. After all,
foreign donors give aid to African countries in an effort to
alleviate the economic and social deprivations in the continent, not
to support kleptocracies that scarcely care about the welfare of
their people.313 Moreover, foreign assistance is usually effective in
cases where the recipient countries "do the right things to help
themselves and have the capacity and the leadership to spend the
money wisely. ' ,3 14 Without donor countries insisting on domestic
reforms to improve the ability of recipient countries to manage
assistance prudently, large infusions of foreign funds will not
310 Deme, supra note 105, at 31.
311 See KEVIN WATKINS, ET. AL., UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005 7 (2005), available at http://hdr.undp.org/
reports/global/2005/pdf/HDR05_overview.pdf [hereinafter UNDP REPORT].
312 New Partnership, supra note 16, 66.
313 See Stephen Ellis, How to Rebuild Africa, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 135
(arguing that more than more money, Africa needs accountable governments that are
responsive to the needs of their citizens).
314 Birdstall, Rodrik & Subramanian, supra note 308, at 142.
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materially improve the conditions in recipient countries.315 In
return for receiving foreign assistance, the recipient countries have
"a responsibility to create an environment in which aid can yield
optimal results."'3 16 Aid conditions have been useful in persuading
recipient countries to create such an environment."
For this reason, foreign donors have a legitimate justification
for conditioning their assistance on the implementation by
recipient African countries of those polices and programs that their
peers in the continent have acknowledged as preconditions for
economic and social revitalization. What is problematic is the
conditioning of assistance on the implementation of policies or
programs devised by outsiders without taking into account the
peculiarities of the continent.31 One of the valid criticisms leveled
against the structural adjustment programs of the IMF and the
World Bank, the implementation of which were often
preconditions for the grant of IMF loans in the 1980s, was that the
programs were devised by outsiders who where ignorant of and
seemingly indifferent to the social costs of the economic policies
force-fed to African countries.3 1 9  In contrast, the NEPAD
blueprint for development of the continent is an indigenous project
devised by Africans which can be modified as needed to adapt to
315 Id. at 143.
316 UNDP REPORT, supra note 311, at 7.
317 See generally Benjamin Pequenino, Is Aid Conditionality a Force for Good
Governance? The Case of Mozambique (Aug. 2002) (unpublished University of
Birmingham Masters of Science dissertation on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
318 UNDP REPORT, supra note 311, at 7. The United Nations Development
Programme cautioned against excessive use of conditionalities by international financial
organizations. Id. However, the UNDP was concerned about the macroeconomic
conditionalities imposed on recipient countries by international financial institutions, not
the tying of aid to the implementation of domestic commitments agreed among
developing nations. See id.
319 See OBIOMA IHEDURU, CONTENDING ISSUES IN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT:
ADVANCES, CHALLENGES AND THE FUTURE 169 (2001) (arguing that the structural
adjustment programs had negative effects on the national economies of those African
countries that implemented them); see also Sayre Schatz, Structural Adjustment in
Africa: A Failing Grade So Far, 32 J. OF MOD. AFR. STUD. 679 (1994) (refuting the
assertion that the World Bank's macro-economic policies have assisted in Africa's
economic development).
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Africa's changing environment.3 20  Furthermore, the APRM
mechanism is overseen by African politicians and technical
experts, not foreigners.3 2  This system is all the more appropriate
at a time when foreign donors are increasingly moving away from
the tendency of trying to micromanage the affairs of recipient
countries.322
The willingness of African countries to abide by their NEPAD
commitments and compel compliance by recalcitrant members is a
more pressing concern under the new partnership than aid
conditionalities. Since NEPAD is based on local ownership, it is
important that member states have the will and the ability to
persuade members to comply with its core objectives. The APRM
does, however, afford African countries a formal mechanism for
monitoring the progress of sister countries and for exerting peer
pressure to encourage reform.323
The recent record of African countries in influencing political
developments in sister countries has been mixed. Most notably in
the African community's commitment to fostering democracy the
continent was reinforced by its refusal to endorse the
unconstitutional attempt to install the son of the late President
Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo as President upon his father's
death.3 24  However, the AU's response to the deterioration of
political governance in Zimbabwe has been less than reassuring,
3 25
and African leaders have often shown "little inclination to
castigate but greater tendency to empathize" with their repressive
colleagues.326
320 New Partnership, supra note 16, T 1.
321 Peer Review, supra note 22, 1, 6.
322 Africa Acknowledges It Must Help Itself, THE ECONOMIST, July 7, 2005, at 46.
NEPAD's emphasis on African ownership of solutions to the continent's problems
"matches the latest trend in the development world, whereby donor countries and
multilateral organizations devolve as much responsibility as possible for anti-poverty and
health programmes to the recipient countries themselves, rather than micro-mange them
as in the past." Id.
323 Peer Review, supra note 22, 3.
324 Africa Acknowledges It Must Help Itself supra note 322. The AU insisted on a
formal election, which Eyadema's son won, although its fairness was disputed. See id.
325 See id.
326 John Akokpari, Policing and Preventing Human Rights Abuses in Africa: the
OAU, the AU and the NEPAD Peer Review, 32 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 461, 469 (2004).
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Whatever the benefits of peer pressure, there are limits to what
it can accomplish, especially when the pressure is unsupported by
an alternative mechanism for compelling change. According to
the Base Document of the APRM, "[i]f dialogue proves
unavailing, the participating Heads of State and Government may
wish to put the Government on notice of their collective intention
to proceed with appropriate measures by a given date." '327 Such
measures are to be used as "a last resort." '328 Oddly, the document
does not state what these "appropriate measures" might be. Since
membership of the APRM process is voluntary, expulsion from
the body is unlikely to be one of the intended sanctions.329 What
appears to be one of the more persuasive ways of concentrating
the attention of the recalcitrant state on the need to implement
recommended changes is the conditioning of certain external
assistance on compliance. It is for this reason, among others, that
the concerns about linking participation in the APRM and the
receipt of foreign aid are somewhat exaggerated.
Although conditioning foreign assistance on good faith efforts
of compliance with APRM recommendations would provide a
necessary incentive for participating countries to improve their
governance, it is important that foreign assistance should not be
denied in areas where denial would have direct adverse effects on
the already deprived population of the recalcitrant country.
Instead, a strategy of carefully targeted withdrawal of assistance,
together with an international campaign against the recalcitrant
country, has the greater likelihood of success without negatively
affecting the short-term material conditions of the people.
Another concern about the APRM relates to its breadth of
coverage. This concern has two prongs: (1) whether the scope is
so broad as to dilute the competence and effectiveness of the
reviews,330 and (2) whether the inclusion of political governance in
the APRM scheme will politicize the process, thereby making it
327 See Peer Review, supra note 22, 24.
328 Id.
329 Id. 11.
330 See Ravi Kanbur, The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): An Assessment
of Concept and Design 1 (Cornell U., Dep't Applied Econ. & Mgmt., 2004),
http://www.arts.cornell.edu/poverty/kanbur/APRM.pdf (arguing that the APRM should
narrow down the scope of its reviews and not overextend itself).
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less attractive to those nations wary of external intrusions into
their political affairs.331 With regard to the first prong, the broad
scope of the APRM requires a considerable investment of
technical and financial resources.332  In terms of technical
resources, at least, NEPAD and the AU have dealt with this
obstacle by taking the commendable step of spreading out the
responsibility for conducting particular aspects of the APRM
reviews. 333 For example, the ECA assists in economic governance
reviews, while the ADB will spearhead reviews of the banking
sector.33' These organizations contribute both expertise and
credibility in their respective areas of concentration and their
inclusion in the APRM process will mitigate the assessment
burden on APR country review teams. Their participation will
also strengthen confidence in the technical competence of the
reviewers. To be sure, the breadth of APRM reviews increases the
financial burden of the process, but the added expense is
warranted in light of the centrality of each review area to the
revival of the continent. Participating African countries recognize
the importance of such a broad mandate and largely support its
implementation. This is demonstrated by the support pledged by
African nations335 and the international community.
3 36
With regard to the second prong, whether the inclusion of
331 See Cilliers, supra note 170, at 1 (describing the controversy about whether the
APRM should include "political review").
332 Deme, supra note 105, at 22.
333 Supra note 141 and accompanying text.
334 Cilliers, supra note 170, at 5.
335 It remains to be seen whether African countries will uphold their financial
commitment to the APRM. With some of them already in arrears in their AU dues, they
may compromise the viability of the APRM by depriving it of much needed funds. See
Dorina Bekoe, Creating a Reliable African Peer Review Mechanism, 14 CHIMERA 2, 6
(2003), available at http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/uaic/uaic-winter2OO3/uaic-winter03-
02.pdf.
336 Deme, supra note 105, at 22. Donor countries that have pledged financial
support include Canada, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Id. African finance
ministers suggested that the APRM should be fully funded by African countries "to
ensure ownership by the continent and reduce perception of foreign influence." See
Cilliers, supra note 170, at 4. While full funding of the APRM by African countries is
desirable, foreign financial support does not necessary undermine the independence of
the review process, which is conducted by African professionals and overseen by
African institutions. Id.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
political governance would compromise the success of the APRM,
it is important to consider what the utility of a peer review
mechanism would be if it excluded the perennial problems of
authoritarianism, maladministration, and lack of accountability
that have long plagued the continent. To be sure, good economic
and corporate governance are crucial in building an environment
conducive to sustainable economic growth. However, without
good political governance, effective economic and corporate
governance are unlikely to materialize in Africa.337 Recognizing
this, the ECA initiated an African Governance Report to monitor
the state of governance in the continent, as reflected in the areas of
political, social, and economic affairs.33 8 These three areas were
included in the report because of "the emerging consensus that
good governance is central to Africa's development agenda and
progress.,339  A peer review mechanism that excludes political
governance is unlikely to have a significant impact on the
continent.3 0
Lack of data is another obstacle confronting the APRM,
especially in terms of assessing the impact of economic and social
policies on the lives of the African people. 341 Poor record-keeping
is prevalent across the continent,34' and there is frequently a
disparity between recorded facts and realities. With time,
337 World Bank, supra note 6, at 50 (arguing that political and economic governance
are intertwined and together influence sustainable development); see also Anne Lennan
& Wendy Ngoma, Quality Governance for Sustainable Development, 4 PROGRESS DEV.
STUD. 279, 279 (2004) (explaining how sustainable development is dependent on the
support given to public institutions and public infrastructure).
338 ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, supra note 18, at 17-20.
339 Id. at 9. In its governance survey, the ECA posed questions about the
effectiveness of the three branches of government, the protection of human rights, the
institutional mechanisms for political representation, and the effectiveness of civil
society organizations. Id. at 10.
340 See Jakkie Cilliers, Peace and Security through Good Governance: A Guide to
the NEPAD African Review Mechanism (Institute for Security Studies, Issue Paper, Apr.
2003), at 2, available at http://www.iss.org.za/Pubs/Papers/70/Paper70.pdf.
341 Stremlau, supra note 151.
342 See Abraham Okolo, The Nigerian Census: Problems and Prospects 53 AM.
STATISTICIAN 321 (1999). Nigeria, for example, does not have accurate or reliable
population count. Not only does this make economic planning difficult, but also it would
also make it difficult for the APRM to evaluate the effectiveness of current economic
policies. Id.
[Vol. XXXII
IMPROVING GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA
participating countries may improve their record-keeping,
enabling them to adequately answer the questions contained in the
APRM questionnaire.3 43 However, in the short term, the lack of
reliable data compounds the difficulty of conducting effective peer
reviews.3"
The credibility and independence of the review panels are also
essential to the effectiveness of the APRM. 345 As membership in
the APRM is voluntary, it is crucial that countries have confidence
in the independence and credibility of the review process.346 The
legitimacy of the process is eroded if the review bodies are viewed
as being under the control of particular organizations or entities,
and the likelihood of the process improving governance in Africa
would be greatly reduced. Recognizing the importance of
legitimacy and transparency, the APR Panel, which has oversight
over the conduct of the review process, is made up of eminent
Africans who have distinguished themselves in areas within the
scope of the mission of the APRM.34 7 Equally important is the
fact that the membership of the panel is supposed to reflect a broad
regional balance.3 4
8
Unlike OECD reviews that are conducted by a permanent staff,
APRM country reviews are done by ad hoc teams.349 APR Teams,
which conduct country reviews, are "constituted only for the
period of the country review visit. '' 350  Although this structure
allows greater flexibility, it does impose two significant obstacles:
(1) ensuring the technical competence of each team, and (2)
making sure that there is consistency in the standards applied.
Crucially, the APRM regulations require that review teams "be
carefully designed to enable an integrated, balanced, technically
343 See COUNTRY SELF-ASSESSMENT, supra note 139.
344 Stremlau, supra note 151.
345 See Botchwey, supra note 12, at 13.
346 Peer Review, supra note 22, 1.
347 Id. 7. The present panel, for example, includes Professor Adebayo Adedeji, the
former Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (1975-1991)
and Chris Stals, the former president of the South African Reserve Bank (1991-1998).
Id.
348 Id.
349 Organisation and Processes, supra note 162, 5.1.
350 Id.
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competent, and professional assessment of the reviewed
country." '351 Furthermore, the fact that the membership of review
teams must receive approval and that their work is overseen by the
APR panel352 should help ensure the technical competence of the
review teams353 and foster consistency in their operations.354
Civil society is vital to the success of the APRM.3 55 Without
the involvement of a vibrant civil society to hold the government
accountable for the implementation of APRM recommendations,
this would have to be primarily based on peer pressure and the
withdrawal of aid. While strategies such as peer pressure and
withdrawing aid are useful, such strategies need to be supported
by broad grassroots action for reform. With its ability to bring
domestic pressure and adverse publicity to bear on governments,
civil society has an important role to play in fostering government
accountability.3 56  Civil society organizations, as a result of
grassroot efforts will, be able to generate local attention and action
regarding the work of the APRM and the actions necessary to
realize the goals of the APRM process within their countries.
Moreover, if the APRM's objective of encouraging African
351 Id.
352 Id.
353 It should be noted that the effectiveness of review teams will be affected by the
quality of research support they receive from the APR Secretariat. The staff strength of
the research department of the Secretariat would be crucial in this regard.
354 Peer Review, supra note 22, T 8. APR Panel members serve for about four
years, a tenure that should provide some stability and continuity in the operations of the
APRM. Id.
355 Larry Diamond has defined civil society as:
...the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self generating, self
supporting, autonomy from the state, and bound by the legal order or set of
shared rules ...it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to
express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange ideas, exchange
information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state
officials accountable. It is an intermediary entity, standing between the private
sphere and the state.
Larry Diamond, Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation 5:3 J.
DEMOCRACY 4, 6 (1994). Ousmane has noted that "[c]ivil society is in a position to
make the endogenous and popular contribution that is missing from the APRM project."
Deme, supra note 105, at 30.
356 See CAN AFRICA CLAIM THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 5, at 71 (arguing that an
active civil society is essential in holding governments accountable).
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ownership of the solutions to the continent's problems is to be
realized, active involvement of the general population and civic
organizations in the journey toward economic and social
development is essential.357
Although civil society has played an important role in
campaigns for the democratization of the continent,358
authoritarian African states have been masters at suppressing
institutions of civil society.359 Years of authoritarian governments
in the continent have whittled down the civic space for dialogue
and contestation of issues. Owing to the gradual democratization
of the continent, this civic space has increased in recent years.360
Nonetheless, if civil society is to play an active role in the APRM,
it is important that it be formally integrated into the APRM's
institutional processes and that participating countries take
seriously their commitment to promoting the "full participation of
relevant stakeholders. 36'
Civil society's participation will be vital at different levels of
the APRM process, including involvement in the institutions that
oversee the APRM process in the reviewed state, the drafting of
the reviewed state's Programme of Action,362 the review of draft
APRM reports, and the monitoring and evaluation of the reforms
recommended by the APRM.36 3
In terms of participation in the institutions overseeing the
APRM process in the reviewed country, the APR Forum has
requested that each participating country set up "broad-based and
all-inclusive" National Coordinating Structures.3 6  These
357 Deng, supra note 309, at 140.
358 John Makumbe, Is there a Civil Society in Africa?, 71 INT'L AFF. 305, 307
(1998).
359 IHEDURU, supra note 319, at 173.
360 See, e.g., Adam Habib, State-Civil Society Relations in Post-Apartheid South
Africa, 72 SOCIAL RESEARCH 671 (2005) (discussing the effect of democratization on the
state of civil society in South Africa).
361 GUIDELINES, supra note 193, 48.
362 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
363 See Organisation and Processes, supra note 162, 7.19.
364 Communiqud Issued at the End of the First Summit of the Committee of the
Participating Heads of State and Government in the African Peer Review Mechanism,
Kigali, Rwanda, Feb. 13, 2004, available at http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/nepad/
aprmcomfeb04.pdf.
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structures, which are to include civil society stakeholders and
private sector participants, are designed to facilitate broad
involvement by non-government bodies in the APRM
operations. 36' This broadening of participation is consistent with
the APR MOU, 366 in which the member countries committed
themselves to ensuring "the participation of all stakeholders in the
development of the national Programme of Action, including trade
unions, women, youth, civil society, private sector, rural
communities, and professional associations. ' 367 Involvement of
stakeholders is also required in the preparation of answers to the
self-assessment questionnaires that the APRM sends to countries
361 i iunder review. It is instructive to note that participating
countries are taking commendable steps to involve civil society
organizations in the APRM process. For example, in preparing for
their country reviews, Ghana 369 and Rwanda included civil society
organizations. Concerns, however, were expressed about the
range of organizations invited and the depth of their involvement
in the process.37°
With regard to the involvement of civil society in the APRM
institutional process, it is useful to summarize the relevant process.
Under the APRM regime, draft reports of APR Teams are
reviewed by the APR Panel and approved by the APR Forum. 371
During the review stage, there is opportunity for the government
of the reviewed country to comment on the draft report and to
share its views on the shortcomings identified.372 It is certainly
useful to give the reviewed country an opportunity to address the
365 See id.
366 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 135, 22.
367 Id.
368 See COUNTRY SELF-ASSESSMENT, supra note 139, 2.1.
369 See Deme, supra note 105, at 30 (on the use of seminars and workshops to raise
public awareness about the APRM Ghana review, and to obtain participation of
stakeholder in the process).
370 ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, COMMITTEE ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND
CIVIL SOCIETY, STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EFFECTIVE STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN
THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM 9-1 1 (2005), available at http://www.uneca.org/
chdcs/chdcs3/strategies-for__promoting-aprm-chdcs3.pdf.
371 Organisation and Processes, supra note 162, 7.14, 7.15.
372 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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findings of the team before its formal adoption by the APR Forum.
But, it is also important that stakeholders have the opportunity to
review the draft to ensure that it incorporates the feedback and
suggestions they made during the country visit. To be sure, the
involvement of a large group of civil society organizations during
this stage of the review process might affect the efficiency of the
process. However, the inclusion of at least a representative of
civil society organizations in the membership of the APR Panel
would go a long way towards ensuring that the interests of these
groups are taken into account in the stages before the formal
adoption of team reports.
Effective monitoring of compliance with the APRM
recommendations will depend, in part, on how widely APRM
reports and recommendations are disseminated within the
continent and how actively civil society organizations are involved
in the strategy to encourage voluntary compliance. Review reports
are required to be made public after their adoption by the APR
Forum.37 3 They are also tabled in regional bodies with the aim of
affording these bodies the opportunity to discuss the findings and
to monitor the responsiveness of the reviewed state to the
implementation of suggested reforms. 37 4 For example, the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights is well suited to
monitor the steps being taken by the reviewed country in
implementing the recommendations of the APRM in the area of
human rights.375
In addition to the formal involvement of regional bodies in the
post-adoption monitoring, the APRM should also engage civil
society in the monitoring of compliance. The media, as societal
watchdogs, should ensure the penetration of the review report to
the grassroots.376 Workshops and seminars will also be useful in
373 Organisation and Processes, supra note 162, IT 7.16, 7.17.
374 Id. 1 7.17. These bodies include the Summit of African Union, the Pan-African
Parliament, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Peace and
Security Council and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union.
Id.
375 See RACHEL MURRAY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA FROM THE OAU TO THE
AFRICAN UNION 51 (2004). Part of the function of the Commission is to receive reports
from African countries on the legislative and other measures they have taken to promote
human rights. Id.
376 See ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, supra note 18, at 20 (discussing the
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obtaining feedback from civil society organizations and other
stakeholders on the progress being made by the reviewed country
in complying with APRM recommendations.3"
It is noteworthy that African civil society organizations are
taking the initiative to position themselves as active participants in
the governance review process. For example, the African Human
Security Initiative, a network of African non-governmental
organizations, is dedicated to measuring the performance of key
African states in promoting human security, one of the areas
covered by the APRM.37 8  The initiative, aimed at fostering the
objectives of NEPAD and the APRM,379 conducts case studies and
reviews of the state of human security in the continent.38 ° In a
similar vein, the Addis Ababa Declaration, made by a collection of
African civil society organizations, calls on these organizations to
"plan strategies to strengthen [their] participation in the APRM"
and to "strengthen cooperation with governments and the private
sector in order to identify problems [and] solutions respecting
national, regional[,] and pan-African interests."38' These kinds of
civil society projects would be useful in focusing public attention
on the APRM agenda and in concentrating the attention of
participating countries on governance reform issues.
difficulty of building a vibrant media in the continent). The APRM Secretariat has noted
that "the press has a critical role in supporting the APRM process and disseminating
accurate information to the general public." See Press Release from the APRM
Secretariat, July 2005, available at http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/newsletter
archive.php.
377 See Organisation and Processes, supra note 162, 7.19. The APRM Secretariat
is required to organize workshops on the "issues identified in the review report." Id.
378 Fatouatta Mboge & Sam Doe, African Commitments to Civil Society
Engagement: A review of eight NEPAD countries I (AHSI, Occasional Paper, Aug.
2004), available at http://www.africanreview.orgldocs/papers/civsoc.pdf.
379 Id.
380 Id. The AHSI has so far chosen eight countries for review. Id.
381 Addis Ababa Declaration on the Role of the African Civil Society with Regard
to the African Peer Review Mechanism, Jan. 18, 2006, http://www.afrodad
.org/index.php (follow Issue tab, then follow article tab, select Addis Ababba APRM
Declaration hyperlink). The declaration was made by representatives of African civil
society organization during a workshop facilitated by the Economic Commission for
Africa, the Partnership Africa Canada, and the Christian Relief and Development
Association. Id.
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VI. Conclusion
The APRM constitutes a reaffirmation by African countries of
their commitment to practices that have been conventionally
understood as preconditions for economic and social
development.382 By committing themselves to the enactment of
practices that promote good governance and to the implementation
of sound macroeconomic policies, APRM countries seek to
reverse the continent's history of developmental malaise and
economic stagnation.383
These commitments, and their reinforcement by peer
mentoring, reflect a realization that Africans have to provide the
primary impulse for the development of their continent. Although
external conditions such as unfair trade rules and structural
inequalities adversely affect material conditions on the
continent,384 the new breed of African leaders believe that the
solution to the myriad problems facing the continent has to begin
with a fundamental reform of political and social policies in the
continent.385
Primarily, African ownership of the solutions to the problems
of the continent is important for several reasons. First, it is a
welcome change from a labored emphasis on the external factors
that contribute to the stagnation of the continent. The
overemphasis of external factors has tended to draw attention
away from the role decades of poor governance and poor policies
have played in inhibiting the development of the continent.
Frequently, autocratic administrations in Africa have committed
human rights abuses, looted public funds, and enacted misguided
economic policies, while all the time pointing fingers of blame at
external conditions. Refocusing attention on internal conditions
should not, however, foreclose paying appropriate attention to the
external factors that not only contribute to the internal
382 New Partnership, supra note 16, 79. In explaining their commitment to the
democracy and political governance initiative, NEPAD members noted that "it is
generally acknowledged that development is impossible in the absence of true
democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance." Id.
383 Peer Review, supra note 22, 3.
384 See UNDP REPORT, supra note 311, at 9-11 ("[The] world's highest trade
barriers are erected against some of its poorest countries").
385 See New Partnership, supra note 16, 49.
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conditions, 3 86 but that are also often independent factors in the
stagnation of the continent.387
Second, by emphasizing the primacy of indigenous solutions
to the problems of the continent, the APRM provides African
countries an opportunity to collaborate in developing working
solutions.388 Many of these countries share similar histories of
colonization, multiculturalism, and difficulties in engaging with
the global economy.389 By working together, they can exchange
ideas about the policies and strategies that are appropriate in light
of the realities of the history, geography, and politics of the
continent.
Finally, if Africa owns the solution to the problems of the
continent and the blueprint for progress is drafted by Africans
themselves, it becomes more difficult for some African countries
to refuse to enact the suggested reforms on the ostensible grounds
that they are imposed by foreign industrial powers. The
elimination of the argument of external imposition of policies on
Africans means that the policies and practices have to be evaluated
based on their merits, untainted by an association with external
powers in a continent that remains sensitive about its history of
colonization.
The NEPAD blueprint is a sound one. It contains a broad-
based strategy for promoting best practices and policies in the
areas of political, economic, and corporate governance and socio-
economic development. The political governance aspects of the
initiative are well-suited to fostering liberal democracies that
respect human rights, the rule of law, the independence of the
386 An example relates to the issue of corruption. African leaders who have bled
their countries dry often stash away their loot in Western financial capitals. It is
certainly odd that Western leaders who rightly condemn corruption in the developing
world have not always aggressively enforced their domestic laws to prevent their
countries from remaining repositories for funds stolen from the developing world. See
Political Corruption and Economic Migration, Comment AFRICAN WEEK, available
at http://www.africaweekmagazine.comnews/comment.php?pageNum-r-comm=28&
totalRows_r-comm=29.
387 See UNDP REPORT, supra note 311, at 9-11
388 See Organisation and Processes, supra note 162, 1 7.19. The APRM stresses the
need for "networking and sharing of experience and best practices among participating
countries." Id
389 New Partnership, supra note 16, 19-26.
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judiciary, and constitutionalism. If effectively implemented, the
economic governance initiative will promote the implementation
of sound economic policies that would stimulate macro-economic
stability, transparency, and economic progress. The corporate
governance initiative should ensure that corporate regulations
foster economically efficient and socially responsible corporate
enterprises. The socio-economic initiative is essential for
assessing the progress being made by participating states in
improving the well being and standard of living of their citizens.
In Africa, the gap between rhetoric and reality has long been
too wide. NEPAD is the latest in a procession of economic and
social blueprints for the revival of Africa.3 9 Designed to promote
stability, economic growth, and sustainable development of the
continent, NEPAD may well suffer the fate of poor
implementation that befell earlier projects. Without an adequate
implementation strategy and an effective mechanism for
persuading African nations to enact the good governance and
sound macroeconomic policies it canvasses, NEPAD's likelihood
of success is remote.
It is against this background that the APRM should be
celebrated as a bold innovation that reinforces the NEPAD
commitments by providing the mechanism for monitoring the
implementation of agreed-upon policies and practices and by
providing a forum for participating countries to exchange ideas
and experience about best practices. Moving away from historical
reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of member states,
African states are now realizing the role of "objective and
constructive criticism that is bound to affect state practice in
various areas [in] accord with international best practices
elsewhere."'3 9'
To be effective in promoting good governance in the continent,
participation in the APRM needs to be broadened and the
participating countries have to demonstrate genuine commitment
to the values of the process.392 They should do this by adequately
390 See DECLARATION, supra note 234, $ 3.
391 Vincent Nmehielle, The African Peer Review Mechanism under the African
Union and its Initiative: The New Partnership for Africa's Development, 98 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 240, 246 (2004).
392 So far only 23 countries have acceded to the APRM. See id.
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funding the institution, ensuring the credibility and integrity of the
review process, and voluntarily implementing the
recommendations made by the APRM. Premised on the idea of
peer learning without a coercive enforcement process, the APRM
relies on the voluntary compliance of participating countries
buttressed by grassroots mobilization efforts by civil society
organizations.
Crucially, the APRM has recognized the importance of civil
society organizations both in the conduct of peer reviews and in
the implementation of review reports.393 The active involvement
of these organizations would help restore the confidence of those
who view NEPAD as an initiative whose "formulation was not
informed by debates and consultations in Africa., 394 It will also
reinforce the democratic agenda of NEPAD by involving the
populace in the review of the performance of their governments.
The APRM is part of a commendable attempt to respond to the
resurgent demand for African countries to implement sound
political and economic practices. Whether the APRM succeeds in
realizing its laudable objective of promoting good governance in
Africa will finally depend on the participants' level of
commitment and on the pressure that is brought to bear on them to
abide by their promise of reform. To the extent that the APRM
contributes to the creation of an environment conducive to the
emergence of good governance in Africa, it will have played an
important role in changing Africa for the better.
393 Organisation and Processes, supra note 162, 1 7.8, 7.9, 7.19.
394 Akokpari, supra note 326, at 471.
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